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I. INTRODUCTION

In Davis v. Bandemer,' the Supreme Court held that partisan gerrymandering could, under certain circumstances, violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' However, the Court did not make
it clear when such gerrymandering is unconstitutional, except insofar as it
rejected proportional representation (a system under which political parties
must be represented in a legislature in proportion to their statewide vote
totals) as a constitutional requirement.' There was no majority opinion.
and the plurality opinion stated only that an unconstitutional gerrymander
existed when the minority party's strength was "consistently degrade[d]" 4-- hardly a clear standard. The purpose of this article is to ascertain whether any possible standard for determining the constitutionality
of redistricting plans is both workable and consistent with Bandemer.5
The article concludes that the courts should uphold a redistricting plan if it
(1) is the result of a bipartisan compromise or (2) yields results similar to
those which a bipartisan compromise would have created.
II. BACKGROUND
A. What Is Gerrymanderingand Why Is It So Bad?
1. What Is Gerrymandering and How Did It Come to Exist?
A gerrymander is a "distortion of district boundaries and populations
for partisan or personal political purposes."6 Thus, "partisan gerrymandering is gaining through discretionary districting an unjustifiable advantage
for one political party as opposed to the others."'
1. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
2. Id. at 132 (plurality opinion) ('[U]nconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's.., influence on the political process as a whole."). Although only four Justices joined the plurality opinion, two more Justices agreed that partisan gerrymandering could violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 161-85
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
3. Id. at 130.
4. Id. at 132.
5. Thus, the wisdom of the Bandemer opinion will not be discussed in detail. See generally
Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public Inter-

est: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1, 4 (1985) (contending that partisan gerrymandering
claims should be nonjusticiable); John R. Low-Beer, Note, The Constitutional Imperative of Propor-

tional Representation, 94 YALE LJ. 163 (1984) (endorsing proportional representation). However, I
will briefly explain why gerrymandering is pernicious, and why partisan gerrymandering raises constitutional questions. See infra notes 17-33, 181-269 and accompanying text. Even if Bandemer was
wrongly decided, my "bipartisan compromise" test may be a viable legislative solution to gerrymandering, and may also be a way for nonpartisan district drawers to measure the fairness of possible
districting plans.
concurring).
6. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969) (Fortas, J.,
7. Charles Backstrom et al., Issues in Gerrymandering: An Exploratory Measure of Partisan
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District drawers use two techniques to construct a partisan gerrymander: "packing" and "cracking." Packing "packs" the opposing party's
members into "a relatively small number of districts so that the [opposing
party] is virtually assured of winning with overwhelmingly large majorities
in those few districts but of losing in the others."8 Cracking "cracks" or
splits the opposing party's vote so that it "has large but inefficacious minorities in most or all of the districts."9
A gerrymander will often combine packing and cracking. For example,
in 1812 the Massachusetts legislature, which was dominated by the Democrat-Republican party (known colloquially as "Republicans" and "Democrats" 0 ), passed a redistricting plan for the state senate." The plan
packed the opposing Federalist party's vote by dividing "the state into grotesque portions ...

to place large numbers of Federalist voters into

disproportionately few senate districts," 12 and "cracked" the Federalist
vote by "scatter[ing] the remaining Federalist voters in districts around the
rest of the state."' 3 After the bill was signed into law by Democratic
Governor Elbridge Gerry, a Boston newspaper described the plan as a
"gerrymander" by combining Governor Gerry's name "and the salaman4
der, which the most convoluted senate district was said to resemble.'
Ever since 1812, the term "gerrymander" has been used to describe highly
partisan redistricting plans."
Despite Federalist lampoons, the Democrats' gerrymander was quite
GerrymanderingApplied to Minnesota, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1121, 1129 (1978).
8. Michael D. McDonald & Richard L. Engstrom, Detecting Gerrymandering, in POLITICAL
GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 178, 178-79 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990) [hereinafter POLITICAL
GERRYMANDERING].

9. Id. at 179.
10. See SAMUEL E. MORISON ET AL.. I THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 328-29

(1969): Allan B. Moore, Note. A "Frightful Political Dragon" Indeed: Why Constitutional Challenges
Cannot Subdue the Gerrymander, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 949, 950-51 (1990). The DemocratRepublicans were an anti-Federalist party led by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, at the time of
the Massachusetts gerrymander. See id. at 950 n.2. The Democrat-Republicans later split into Whigs
and Democrats. See id. The Democrat-Republicans have been referred to as "Democrats," id. at 95051, "Republicans," MORISON ET AL., supra, at 328-29, and "Jeffersonian Republicans." SOL BARZMAN,
MADMEN AND GENIUSES 44 (1974).
11. See Moore, supra note 10, at 950.
12. David L. Anderson, Note, When Restraint Requires Activism: Partisan Gerrymandering and
the Status Quo Ante. 42 STAN. L. REV. 1549. 1550 (1990).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1551: see also Moore, supra note 10, at 951-52. Ironically, Gerry, who later became
Vice President. did not actively support the gerrymander and contemplated vetoing it. Id. at 950 n.3.
15. See Richard L. Engstrom. The Supreme Court and Equipopulous Gerrymandering: A Remaining Obstacle in the Quest for Fair and Effective Representation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277, 279-80.
However, gerrymandering had existed long before 1812. "It has been identified in this country as early
as 1705. when the colonial legislature in Pennsylvania sought to retain political power within the rural.
eastern counties through a representational structure discriminating [against] residents of the city of
Philadelphia." Id. at 280.
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successful. The Democrats won "29 of the [state's] 40 senate seats while
losing the popular vote 50,164 to 51,766. '' 6
2. What Is Wrong With Gerrymandering?
Scholars and public interest groups have criticized gerrymandering for
a variety of reasons. 7 Even nonpartisan gerrymandering "violates the
American constitutional tradition by conceding to legislatures [the] power
of self-selection."' 8 For example, if State Senator John Doe (a white
Democrat) chairs the state senate's redistricting committee, he can create a
safe district,for himself by removing Republicans and ethnic minorities
from his district.
Partisan gerrymandering is especially pernicious, for two reasons.
First, a partisan gerrymander may allow "a party with only a minority of
the popular vote [to] assert control over a majority of seats in the state
assembly and over its state's delegation to the national House of Representatives."' 9 Second, a partisan gerrymander may allow "a party that enjoys only a small majority in popular support over its principal competitor... [to] translate this popular edge into preemptive institutional dominance."2 Whether a gerrymander creates a majority party or merely increases the majority's power, it may "lock in" a partisan imbalance so
skillfully that the legislature is not "responsive to the changing will of the
electorate."'"
Other commentators have argued that partisan gerrymandering is not
an unmitigated evil, for several reasons. First, it has been argued that by
enlarging the majority party's power, a partisan gerrymander "reinforce[s]
the majority party's capacity to govern alone, making it easier to attribute
22
responsibility for political acts, such as legislation, to a single party.
This argument lacks merit, for two reasons. First, if the gerrymandering
party does not control the executive branch, gerrymandering actually reinforces divided government and thereby makes the executive branch less
rather than more accountable. For example, Democratic gerrymanders of
congressional delegations may have reduced governmental accountability
because the Republicans have controlled the presidency for most of the

16. Id.
17. Moore, supra note 10, at 961-62.
18. Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural
SafeguardAgainst PartisanGerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 301, 304 (1991).
19. Id. at 302.
20. Id.
21. Bernard Grofman. Criteriafor Districting:A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV.
77. 112 (1985).
22. Peter H. Schuck. The Thickest Thicket: PartisanGerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of
Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1361 (1987).
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past twenty-five years. Second, a gerrymander may not increase the majority party's seat share if it allows a party with a minority of the popular
vote to narrowly win legislative control (rather than merely augmenting
the majority party's dominance).
' 3
Second, it has been argued that "all districting is gerrymandering
because " '[t]he drawing of district boundaries cannot but involve political
judgments and political results.' [Consequently,] there is no a priori standard to follow, no politically neutral definition of 'fair and effective representation.' ,124 This argument proves too much. If no rule is neutral, why
is a rule electing the legislative candidate who gets the most votes any
fairer than a rule electing the candidate with the least votes? After all, the
former rule favors popular over unpopular candidates. Indeed, all political
ground rules (such as the rule prohibiting racial gerrymandering) affect
political outcomes.
The idea that "no rule is neutral" rests on the assumption that "a
,neutral' rule must disregard outcomes. -6 As shown above, this assumption leads to absurd consequences. A more sensible definition of "neutrality" is that a "neutral" or "fair" districting plan or electoral procedure is
one which accords with "accepted ideas of procedural fairness-in other
words, that the person who did win, should have won, with 'should' drawing its meaning from precisely the democratic ideas that are [represented]
' 7
by holding elections in the first place.
Admittedly, it is not always clear what constitutes "fair representation"
or a "neutral" districting rule. It does not follow, however, that one cannot
define certain practices (such as racial or partisan gerrymandering) as unfair, because "decision makers often do, and indeed often must, move
away from a wrong position without being able to specify precisely what
ideal position they are moving toward. 2 8
A third progerrymandering argument is that "gerrymandering is a selflimiting enterprise... [because] the legislative majority must weaken
some of its safe seats, thus exposing its own incumbents to greater risks of
defeat., 29 Admittedly, "[w]hen gerrymanderers try to spread their party's

23. Polsby & Popper, supra note 18, at 310.
24. Moore, supra note 10. at 970 (quoting REAPPORTIONMENT POLITICS. THE HISTORY OF REDISTRICTING IN THE 50 STATES 24 (Leroy C. Hardy et al. eds.. 1981)); see also Lowenstein & Steinberg,
supra note 5. at 4 ("[Tlhere are no coherent public interest criteria for legislature districting independent of substantive conceptions of the public interest.").
25. Polsby & Popper, supra note 18. at 310-11.
26. Id. at 310.
27. Id. at 311.
28. Martin Shapiro, Gerrymandering, Unfairness, and the Supreme Court, 33 UCLA L. REV.
227. 228 (1985).
29. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 152 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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voting strength thinly, in order to capture as many seats as possible, they
leave themselves vulnerable to electoral tides that may sweep their party
out of office."3 However, a sophisticated gerrymander can avoid such
pitfalls by creating "districts with a sufficient cushion of [majority party]
partisan sympathizers... to make the districts safe for that party."'" For
example, suppose that California has forty-five state senate districts with
eleven voters per district, and of the state's 495 voters, 248 are Republican
and 247 are Democrats. An unsophisticated Democratic district drawer
will create forty-one districts which are 6-5 Democratic and four districts
which are 10-1 or 11-0 Republican. Under this plan, the Democrats would
ideally have a 41-4 lead, but might lose most of their legislators if the
state moved even slightly towards the Republicans. A more sophisticated
plan will create thirty-five districts which are 7-4 (or 63%) Democratic,
and ten overwhelmingly (10-1 or 11-0) Republican districts. Under this
plan, the Democrats are almost certain to retain about a 3-1 lead in the
legislature even if they are consistently outpolled by the Republicans.
Fourth, it has been argued that voters are just as well represented by a
gerrymander as by any other districting plan, because
[s]o long as candidates must compete for electoral pluralities or
majorities in a district, simple political expediency dictates that
they take into account the preferences and interests of all constituents whose votes they may need some day, including at least
some of those who might ordinarily be expected to support their
opponents.32
But if legislators tried to represent their political adversaries as well as
they represented their supporters, there would be no difference between
Democrats and Republicans. As this is not the case, a gerrymandered legislature is obviously less representative of the minority party's voters (at
least on ideologically divisive issues) than it would be in the absence of a
gerrymander.
B. JudicialIntervention in Redistricting
1. One Person, One Vote
In the early 1960s, the Supreme Court "stomped through decades of

30. Grofman, supra note 21, at 156.
31. Id.
32. Peter H. Schuck, PartisanGerrymandering:A Political Problem Without JudicialSohtion, in
POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING, supra note 8, at 240, 245.
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contrary precedent and into the political thicket of redistricting."33 In
Baker v. Carr,34 the Court held that challenges to the apportionment of
voters between legislative districts were justiciable.35 Two years later, the
Court created what is known as the "one person, one vote" rule.36 Under
this rule, the Equal Protection Clause requires state legislatures to "eliminate population disparities among districts."37 The Court has applied this
rule to both congressional38 and state legislative39 redistricting, on the
ground that if these districts are unequally populated, residents of larger
districts would have their votes unconstitutionally undervalued."
In cases involving congressional districting, the Court has refused to
create a de minimis exception to the one person, one vote rule, even
where the deviation between the largest district and the smallest was under
one percent and was so low that it was "smaller than the predictable
undercount in available census data."'" The Court has qualified this seemingly harsh rule by suggesting that an otherwise unconstitutional plan may
be upheld if a state proves "that the population deviations in its plan were
necessary to achieve some legitimate state objective ....Any number of
consistently applied legislative policies might justify some variance, including, for instance, making districts compact, respecting municipal
boundaries, preserving the cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests
between incumbent Representatives."4 However, the Court has rarely
accepted
such justifications in cases involving congressional redistrict43
ing.
By contrast, the Court has held that "minor deviations from mathematical equality among state legislative districts are insufficient to make out a
prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment so as to require justification by the State."' Specifically, the Court
has held that "an apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation [between the largest and the smallest district] under ten percent falls

33. T. Thomas Singer, Reappraising Reapportionment, 22 GONZ. L. REV. 527, 529 (1987-88).
34. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
35. Id. at 209-10, 237.
36. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13-3. at 1065 (2d ed. 1988).
37. Id. § 13-3. at 1064.
38. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (basing the decision on U.S. CONST. art. 1. § 2).
39. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533. 568 (1964) (basing the decision on the Equal Protection
Clause).
40. Id.
41. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725. 731 (1983).
42. Id. at 740.
43. Tribe, supra note 36, § 13-6, at 1074 (suggesting that "as far as congressional apportionment
is concerned, the possibility of justifying deviations from exact equality is more theoretical than real").
44. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973).
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within this category of minor deviations."4 Moreover, the Court has upheld larger deviations where state and local governments have justified
them.46
Before Reynolds and similar cases, some states had not redistricted in
many years. For example, Alabama had not altered its state legislative
districts between 1901 and the Reynolds v. Sims47 litigation4" (which
began in 1961)."9 By contrast, since 1964 every state has had to redistrict
every ten years in order to conform with the one person, one vote doctrine." As a result, "legislators now have the opportunity to redesign
boundary lines for their own political interests every ten years." 5' Because state legislators have frequently taken advantage of their opportunities to engage in gerrymandering, the one person, one vote doctrine may
have encouraged other forms of vote dilution, 2 including partisan gerrymandering. 3
C. GerrymanderingBefore Bandemer
Over the past thirty-five years, the Court has gradually expanded its
power to adjudicate gerrymandering-related disputes, and has been especially hostile to racial gerrymandering. However, the Court has been more
deferential towards other forms of gerrymandering.
1. Racial Gerrymandering
The Supreme Court first dealt with racial gerrymandering in Gomillion
v. Lightfoot.' Gomillion struck down an Alabama law which excluded

45. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983).
46. Id. at 847 (upholding an otherwise invalid plan, partially because of a longstanding, neutrally
applied policy of preserving county boundaries).
47. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
48. Id. at 583.
49. Id. at 537.
50. Cf.id. at 583 (stating that decennial reapportionment is a rational approach). The Reynolds
Court declined to directly require decennial reapportionment, but suggested that "compliance with such
an approach would clearly meet the minimal requirements for maintaining a reasonably current scheme
of legislative representation." Id. at 583-84.
51. Michelle H. Browdy, Computer Models and Post-Bandemer Redistricting, 99 YALE L.J.
1379, 1381 (1990).
52. "Vote Dilution" is "the impermissible discriminatory effect of a districting plan when it operates 'to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of [minority] groups.' " Hastert v. State Bd. of
Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634, 646 (N.D. Il. 1991) (alteration in original) (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey,
379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)). For example, gerrymandering or at-large districting may constitute vote
dilution if it is sufficiently egregious to be unconstitutional or illegal under the Voting Rights Act.
53. See Karcher,462 U.S. at 776 n.12 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (suggesting that strict application of the one person, one vote rule has encouraged gerrymandering).
54. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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African-Americans 5 from local elections in the City of Tuskegee by redrawing the city's boundaries as a "strangely irregular twenty-eight-sided
figure."56 The new boundaries removed all but a handful of its 400 African-American voters from the city without removing a single white voter." The plaintiffs, local black voters, did not claim that their votes were
underweighed in their new jurisdiction.58 Nevertheless, the Court held the
Alabama law was unconstitutional, because it "single[d] out a readily
isolated segment of a racial minority for special discriminatory treatment."59
The Court later expanded Gomillion to bar racially motivated redis-

tricting within a state or municipality. For example, in White v.
Regester,W the Court held that multimember state legislative districts in
Dallas and San Antonio unconstitutionally diluted the votes of AfricanAmericans and Mexican-Americans, because (1) the state's multimember
districting scheme adversely affected racial minorities and (2) "the political processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open to
participation by the [ethnic] group[s] in question ... [because their] mem-

bers had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice.""
In City of Mobile v. Bolden,62 the Court clarified White by holding
that a redistricting statute violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments only if it is racially motivated.63 Thus, under White and Bolden, redistricting which (1) is meant to injure an ethnic minority and (2) in fact
does injure that minority, remains unconstitutional.'

55. In this article, the terms "black" and "African-American" shall be used interchangeably.
56. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 340.
59. Id. at 346. Although Goiillion was decided under the Fifteenth Amendment, later cases
involving racial gerrymandering have usually been litigated under the Fourteenth Amendment. See.
e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
60. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
61. Id. at 765-66. Specifically, the Court found that African-Americans and Mexican-Americans
had fewer political opportunities than whites, because of: (1) Texas' history of racial discrimination.
(2) social inequalities caused by such discrimination, (3) other election rules which adversely affected
racial minorities, (4) local legislators' unresponsiveness to minority interests, and (5) the Dallas Democratic Party's slating system, which was unresponsive to African-American concerns. Id. at 766-70.
62. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
63. Id. at 62-70.
64. Bandemer. 478 U.S. at 139-41 & n.17 (plurality opinion): see also Whitcomb v. Chavis. 403
U.S. 124, 143 (1971) (stating that multimember districts are subject to challenge where they operate to
minimize or cancel out voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population); Fortson
v. Dorsey. 379 U.S. 433 (1965) (suggesting that multimember districts may violate equal protection by
minimizing minority representation, but upholding challenged districting plan). After Bolden, Congress
amended the Voting Rights Act to prohibit election laws which unintentionally minimized minority
voters' influence. See Act of June 29, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205. § 3. 96 Stat. 131. 134 (codified as
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In Shaw v. Reno,' the Court expanded its prohibition of racial gerrymandering to restrict "affirmative gerrymandering" aimed at increasing the
power of ethnic minorities.' In Shaw, plaintiffs challenged a redistricting
plan which drew "unusually shaped" 67 districts in order to create an additional majority-black district.6 For example, one district was approximately 160 miles long, but no wider than an interstate highway. 9 The
district wound "in snake-like fashion through tobacco country, financial
centers, and manufacturing areas 'until it gobble[d] in enough enclaves of
black neighborhoods.' "7 The district court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint, because the redistricting plan was enacted "to comply with the
Voting Rights Act . . . [and] did not lead to proportional
underrepresentation of white voters statewide."'"
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal
Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effect to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks
sufficient justification.72
The Court added that it was not deciding what constitutes a "sufficient
justification" for a redistricting plan, nor was it deciding "whether 'the
intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more' always
gives rise to an equal protection claim." 3 The Court then remanded so
the lower court could determine whether the plan was "so irrational on its
face that it [could] be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into
separate voting districts because of their race"'74 and if so, whether the

amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988)); Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
65. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
66. Id. at 2832.
67. Id. at 2820. The plaintiffs contended that the reapportionment plan violated several provisions
of the U.S. Constitution, including the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
2821.
68. Id. at 2820-21.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2820 (Voorhees, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Shaw v. Barr,
808 F. Supp 461, 476 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993)).
71. Id. at 2822 (citing Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. at 472-73).
72. Id. at 2828.
73. i. (quoting id. at 2839 (White, J., dissenting)).
74. Id. at 2832. By contrast, the Court suggested that plans designed to create minority enclaves
are permissible if they adhere "to traditional districting principles." Id. at 2829 (citing United Jewish
Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144. 168 (1977) (plurality opinion) (allowing creation of districts that give
minority racial groups the opportunity to be the majority ifsound districting principles such as com-
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plan was "narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest."75 In response to the dissent's claim that "racial gerrymandering poses no constitutional difficulties when district lines are drawn to favor the
minority, rather than the majority,"76 the Court stated that "equal protection analysis is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefitted by a particular classification.""
Thus, after Shaw it appears that even prominority redistricting plans
may be struck down as unconstitutional racial gerrymanders if they (1)
have no purpose other than to pack ethnic minorities into minority-dominated districts, and (2) are not justified by a compelling state interest.
However, it is not clear where the courts will "draw the line" separating
unconstitutional redistricting plans from permissible ones.
2. Bipartisan and Nonpartisan Gerrymandering
Although the Supreme Court has decided numerous racial gerrymandering cases, it did not address vote dilution claims brought by political
groups until the case of Gaffney v. Cummings." In Gaffney, Connecticut
Democrats79 challenged Connecticut's 1972 reapportionment plan, which
was drawn by an ostensibly bipartisan commission" with "the conscious
intent to create a districting plan that would achieve a rough approximation of the statewide political strengths of the Democratic and Republican
Parties."'" Plaintiffs alleged that the Connecticut plan was "nothing less
than a gigantic political gerrymander, invidiously discriminatory under the
82
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court upheld the plan, holding that it had no "constitutional war-

pactness and population equality are employed)).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2829.
77. Id. (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
78. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
79. See Dean Alfange, Jr., Gerrymandering and the Constitution: Into the Thorns of the Thicket
at Last, in 1986 Sup. Cr. REV. 175, 206 (Philip B. Kurland et al. eds., 1987) (noting that Democrats
challenged the plan because a plan that "employed neutral districting criteria" would favor Democrats
due to "the heavy concentration of Republican voters in suburban Fairfield County").
80. Engstrom, supra note 15, at 301 (noting although the commission was bipartisan, a Democratic member of commission objected to the plan, but a Republican and "third member of the board,
who had been selected by the other two." supported the plan).
81. Gaffney. 412 U.S. at 752. Ironically, the plan's results were far different from the parties*
expectations. The Commission intended to create "70 safe Democratic seats, 55 to 60 safe Republican
seats," and about 25-30 "swing" seats. Id. at 738 n.4. In fact, the Democrats' share of the state's 151
House seats ranged from 58 (after the 1972 elections) to 118 (after the 1974 elections). See BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 506
(1977).
82. Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 752.
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rant to invalidate a state plan ... because it undertakes, not to minimize
or eliminate the political strength of any group or party, but to recognize it
and, through districting, provide a rough sort of proportional representation in the legislative halls of the state." 3 According to the Court, redistricting "without regard for political impact"' was impractical, for two
reasons. 5 First, such a "politically mindless approach may produce,
whether intended or not, the most grossly gerrymandered results."86 Second, the Court added that "it is most unlikely that the political impact of
such a plan would remain undiscovered by the time it was proposed or
adopted, in which event the results would be both known and, if not
changed, intended." 7 Thus, Gaffney stands for the proposition that a bipartisan gerrymander (i.e., a redistricting plan intended to satisfy both
major parties by reflecting their relative strength) is constitutional.
3. Partisan Gerrymandering Before Bandemer
In numerous pre-Bandemer cases, the Supreme Court stated in dictum
that redistricting plans which discriminate against political groups may be
unconstitutional. For instance, in Gaffney, the Court suggested that a
multimember district would violate the Fourteenth Amendment if it is
employed "to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population." 8 However, prior to Bandener,
the Supreme Court generally refused to decide partisan gerrymandering
claims, summarily affirming both lower court opinions which adjudicated
such claims and those which held that partisan gerrymandering claims
were not justiciable. 9
In Karcher v. Daggett,' every opinion addressed political gerrymandering, although the majority opinion did not directly address its constitutionality. Karcher invalidated New Jersey's 1982 congressional redistricting plan because "the population deviations in the plan were not functionally equal as a matter of law, and ... the plan was not a good-faith effort
to achieve population equality using the best available census data."'" In
a footnote, the majority rejected Justice White's suggestion that its strict

83. Id. at 754.
84. Id. at 753. Several possible techniques of achieving neutral redistricting exist. See infra part
III.C-III.C.2.e.
85. Gaffizey, 412 U.S. at 753.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 751 (emphasis added) (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)).
89. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 120.
90. 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
91. Id. at 744.
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application of the one person, one vote rule promoted gerrymandering.92
However, the majority opinion did not directly address the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering.
Justice Stevens, one of the five Justices in the majority, joined in the
majority opinion, but wrote in a concurring opinion that "political gerrymandering is one species of 'vote dilution' that is proscribed by the Equal
Protection Clause,"93 for two reasons. First, Justice Stevens stated that the
Equal Protection Clause "requires every State to govern impartially."'
Election rules which "serve no purpose other than to favor one segment
[of the community] ...or to disadvantage a politically weak segment of
the community ...violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection."95 Second, Justice Stevens found that political gerrymandering was
analogous to racial gerrymandering, based on the Court's repeated statements that states could not dilute "the voting strength of racial or political
elements of the voting population."9 Justice Stevens found that the New
Jersey plan's partisanship "certainly strengthen[ed] [the] conclusion that
the New Jersey plan violate[d] the Equal Protection Clause"97 but explicitly refused to decide whether the New Jersey plan's partisan features
alone rendered it unconstitutional.98
The dissenters, like the majority, wrote two separate opinions. Justice
White wrote for all four dissenters, and did not directly address the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering." However, he did criticize the
majority's absolutist application of the one person, one vote rule by claiming that:
Although neither a rule of absolute equality nor one of substantial
equality can alone prevent deliberate partisan gerrymandering, the
former offers legislators a ready justification for disregarding
geographic and political boundaries .... Legislatures intent on

92. Id. at 734 n.6.
93. Id. at 744 (Stevens, J., concurring). Specifically, Justice Stevens wrote that a rebuttable presumption of unconstitutional gerrymandering should be found where the plan significantly impacts a
defined political group adversely and "departs dramatically from neutral criteria." Id.at 754 (Stevens.
J., concurring). Also, Justice Stevens wrote that a prima facie showing of discrimination may be made
by reliance on the one person, one vote principle or by showing substantial divergences from a mathematical standard of compactness and extensive deviation from established political boundaries. Id. at
755-59 (Stevens. J.. concurring).
94. Id. at 748 (Stevens, J.. concurring).
95. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 749 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Gaffihey, 412 U.S. at 751).
97. Id. at 762 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); see infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text (describing
evidence of the New Jersey plan's partisan nature).
98. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 764-65.
99. See id. at 765-83 (White, J., dissenting).
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minimizing the representation of selected political or racial
groups are invited to ignore political boundaries and compact
districts so long as they adhere to population equality."°
Justice White added that gerrymanders are a "far greater potential threat to
equality of representation""' than unequally populated districts.Finally, Justice Powell, who joined in Justice White's dissent, wrote a
separate dissent which stated that he was "prepared to entertain constitutional challenges to partisan gerrymandering that reaches the level of dis'
crimination described by Justice Stevens. '""t
Justice Powell suggested
that the New Jersey plan might be an unconstitutional gerrymander because the plan's districts reflect no "attempt to follow natural, historical,
or local political boundaries,"' 3 created "several districts which are anything but compact, and at least one district which is contiguous only for
yachtsmen"'0 4 and apparently was intended to hurt Republicans."
In Karcher, Justices Stevens and Powell explicitly found that partisan
gerrymandering was unconstitutional if it was sufficiently severe. and
lacked any neutral justification,"'° and Justice White, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist, hinted that gerrymandering might be unconstitutional by saying that it was a "greater potential
threat" to equality of representation than unequally populated districts.0 7
Thus, after Karcher, "[t]he time seemed ripe for determining whether
08
political gerrymandering was justiciable."'
4. Davis v. Bandemer
The full Court finally addressed partisan gerrymandering in Davis v.
Bandemer.' 9 Bandemer arose out of Indiana's 1981 state legislative redistricting plan."0 When the plan was enacted, the governor was a Republican, and both houses of the state legislature were dominated by Republicans."' Not surprisingly, the legislature passed plans created by the
100. Id. at 776 (White. J.. dissenting) (emphasis added).
101. Id. (White, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 542, 555 (1969)).
102. Id. at 787 (Powell, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 789 (Powell, J., dissenting).
104. Id. (Powell, J.,dissenting) (quoting-Daggett v. Kimmelman, 535 F. Supp. 978, 984 (D.NJ.
1982) (Gibbons, J., dissenting), affid sub nom. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983)).
105. See id. (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (describing letter by speaker of state House as "harshly partisan").
106. Id. at 754-59 (Stevens, J.. concurring); id. at 787-89 (Powell, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 776 (White, J.,
dissenting).
108. Gordon E. Baker, The UnfinishedReapportionment Revolution, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING. supra note 8. at 11, 20.
109. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
110. Id. at 113-15.
111. Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1482-83 (S.D. Ind. 1984), rev'd, 478 U.S. 109
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Indiana Republican Party' in order to "protect[ ] [Republican] incumbents and creat[e] every possible 'safe' Republican district possible."" 3
In the 1982 elections (the first election under the districting plan), Democratic candidates for the state house earned 51.9% of the statewide vote,
but only received 43 of 100 seats." 4 However, Democrats were only
slightly under-represented in state senate elections, receiving 53.1% of the
statewide vote and 52% of the seats." 5
Indiana Democrats sued to invalidate both the house and senate plans
on the ground that they constituted unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders." 6 The district court invalidated the plans based on Justice Stevens'
concurrence in Karcher."7 In support of this conclusion, the district
court relied on the disproportionate results of the 1982 elections, the irregular shape of some district lines, the legislature's attempt to dilute the
Democratic vote by putting Democratic areas in Republican-dominated
multimember districts, the legislature's disregard for political subdivision
boundaries, and the legislature's failure to offer an adequate explanation
for the more unusual features of its redistricting plan."'
On appeal, the Supreme Court split into three blocs. Justice White
wrote a plurality opinion joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and
Blackmun which held that political gerrymandering was justiciable, and
upheld the Indiana plans at issue." 9 Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Rehnquist and O'Connor voted to uphold the Indiana plan on the ground
that political gerrymandering claims raise a nonjusticiable political question.' 21 Justices Powell and Stevens dissented, on the basis that the Indiana plan was unconstitutional. 2' Thus, a 6-3 majority of the Court held
that political gerrymandering was actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment, while a different 7-2 majority held that the Indiana redistricting plan
was constitutional. Each of these issues will be briefly discussed below.

(1986).
112. Id. at 1483-84.
113. Id. at 1488.
114. Id. at 1485.
115. See id. at 1486. According to the Democrats, however, the proportional results of the 1982
senate election were misleading because most of the Democrats' 1982 wins were in "safe" Democratic
areas. Bandemer. 478 U.S. at 182 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The results of
the 1984 state senate election, in which Democrats won 42.3% of the votes and only 28% of the seats
corroborates this contention. Id. at 182-83.
116. Bandemer, 603 F. Supp. at 1489.
117. Id. at 1490.
118. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 116.
119. Id. at 113-43 (plurality opinion).
120. Id. at 143-44 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 144 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 161-85 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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a. Justiciability
It is well settled that the courts should refuse to decide a case on the
merits if it is nonjusticiable-that is, if it presents a "political question."'" A political question exists if there is
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question."
The Bandemer Court held that political gerrymandering claims were
justiciable, for several reasons. First, the plurality noted that in racial
gerrymandering cases, the Court had repeatedly stated that districting
which might dilute " 'the voting strength of racial or political elements of
the voting population' would raise a constitutional question."' 24 Second,
the plurality noted that Gaffney supported justiciability because the
Court considered the merits of a challenge to a bipartisan gerrymander "in
the face of a discussion of justiciability in [the defendant's] brief."' 26
Third, the Court held that the one person, one vote cases indicate "the
justiciability of claims going to the adequacy of representation in state
legislatures"'27 because "in formulating the one person, one vote formula, the Court characterized the question posed by election districts of disparate size as an issue of fair representation.' 2' Fourth, the Court relied
on its racial gerrymandering cases.' 29 The Court admitted that political
groups were not as immutable or as "subject to the same historical
stigma' ' 30 as racial groups, but held that their differences were irrelevant
to justiciability because there was no reason to believe that

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See id. at 119-20.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 119 (alteration in original).
412 U.S. 735 (1973).
Bandenter, 478 U.S. at 119.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 125.
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the standards . . set forth here for adjudicating this political gerrymandering claim are less manageable than the standards that
have been developed for racial gerrymandering claims ... [or that
there is an] initial policy decision-regarding, for example, the
desirability of fair group representation-we have made here that
we have not made in the race cases."'
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote that "the partisan
gerrymandering claims of major political parties raise nonjusticiable political questions that the judiciary should leave to the legislative branch."'3
Justice O'Connor challenged the majority's interpretation of precedent in
three ways. First, the one person, one vote cases did not require adjudication of gerrymandering cases because their requirement of population
equality was "relatively simple and judicially manageable"' 33 and "the
one person, one vote principle safeguards the individual's right to vote,
not the interests of political groups."' 34 By contrast, the plurality's "consistent degradation" test for deciding political gerrymandering cases protected group rights and was judicially unmanageable.'35 Second, Gaffney,
which treated a claim of bipartisan gerrymandering as justiciable, was not
on point because (1) the Gaffney Court did not directly address the justiciability issue,'36 and (2) Gaffney actually supported a finding that partisan gerrymandering is per se constitutional, as both bipartisan and partisan
gerrymandering cause some voters to "lose any chance to elect a representative who belongs to their party, because they have been assigned to a
district in which the opposing party holds an overwhelming advantage."' 37 Third, Justice O'Connor argued the Court's racial gerrymandering cases were not on point, because (1) the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to prohibit racial rather than political discrimination; 3
(2) racial gerrymandering was unconstitutional only if an ethnic minority
has "essentially been shut out of the political process,"'39 while Republicans and Democrats "cannot claim that they [were] a discrete and insular
group vulnerable to exclusion from the political process by some dominant

131. Id.
132. Id. at 144 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 149 (O'Connor, J.. concurring).
134. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
135. See id. at 155 (O'Connor, J.. concurring).
136. See id. at 153-54 (O'Connor. J., concurring) (noting that the Gaffizey Court "did not confront
the difficulties in framing a manageable standard" because it "rejected the challenge to bipartisan
gerrymandering out of hand").
137. See id. at 154 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
138. See id. at 151 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 152 (O'Connor, J.. concurring) (quoting id. at 139 (plurality opinion)).
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group... [as they] are the dominant group";"4 and (3) measuring a political party's voting strength is far more difficult than measuring a racial
group's voting strength because "while membership in a racial group is an
immutable characteristic, voters can-and often do-move from one party
to the other or support candidates from both parties.''
Justice O'Connor also contended that there was no practical need for
judicial intervention, for three reasons. t 4 First, "there is good reason to
think that political gerrymandering is a self-limiting enterprise . . . [because] [i]n order to gerrymander, the legislative majority must weaken
some of its safe seats, thus exposing its own incumbents to greater risks of
defeat."' 43 Second, because the plurality admitted that "elected candidates
will not ignore the interests of voters for the losing candidate,"'" gerrymandering does not shut the minority party out of the political process.
Third, individual voters are not injured by a gerrymander because voters
in one district are not injured by "a supposed diminution of the statewide
voting influence of a political group."' 45
Justice O'Connor further argued that the plurality's "consistent degradation" test was so vague that it would "either prove unmanageable and
arbitrary or else evolve towards some loose form of proportionality."'46
In support of this view, Justice O'Connor noted that in racial gerrymandering cases, the courts had been forced to consider an ethnic minority's
share of seats, 47 and that the plurality's "consistent degradation" test implicitly required proportionality by focusing on whether "the complaining
political party could be expected to regain control of the state legislature
in the next few elections."' 48 Justice O'Connor also contended that a rule
against racial gerrymandering was more manageable than a rule against
political gerrymandering, because "[d]esigning an apportionment plan that
does not impair or degrade the voting strength of several groups is more
difficult than designing a plan that does not have such an effect on one
group."' 41 Justice O'Connor also noted that because political groups (unlike racial groups) are not immutable, measuring a party's strength in the
absence of discrimination would be far more difficult that measuring an

140. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 156 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

142. See id. at 152-53 (O'Connor, J.. concurring).
143. Id. at 152 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).

144. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

153 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
155 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
156-57 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
158 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
156 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

ethnic group's voting strength."'
Finally, Justice O'Connor said adjudication of political gerrymandering
claims required the courts to make two "initial policy determination[s] of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." ' The plurality's first "illegitimate policy determination" was its willingness to uphold bipartisan gerrymanders while rejecting partisan ones.'52 Justice O'Connor wrote that the
two types of cases could not be distinguished because both types of gerrymanders " 'waste' the votes of individuals."' 53 The second illegitimate
policy determination was the plurality's preference for proportionality,
which was "a fundamental policy choice that is contrary to the intent of
[the Constitution's] Framers and to the traditions of this Republic."'54
In response, the plurality defended its use of precedent, for three reasons. First, although the one person, one vote cases were not directly on
point, the plurality's preference "for a level of parity between votes and
representation sufficient to ensure that significant minority voices are
heard and that majorities are not consigned to minority status, is hardly an
illegitimate extrapolation from ...

the objective of fair and adequate rep-

resentation recognized in [such cases]."' 55 Second, Gaffney was not on
point, because bipartisan gerrymanders like the one upheld in Gaffney "are
'
aimed at guaranteeing rather than infringing fair group representation." 56
Third, the differences between political and racial gerrymanders were
irrelevant to the manageability of standards for deciding gerrymandering
cases.'57 The plurality also rebuffed Justice O'Connor's policy concerns.
stating that Justice O'Connor's focus "on the perceived need for judicial
review" '58 would unwisely alter Baker, which limited nonjusticiability to
cases involving a political question.'59
Finally, the plurality stated:
As to the illegitimate policy determinations that Justice O'Connor
believes that we have made, she points to two. The first is a preference for nonpartisan as opposed to partisan gerrymanders, and
the second is a preference for proportionality. On a group level,
however, which must be our focus in this type of claim, neither of

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See id. (O'Connor, J.. concurring).
Id. at 155 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
See id. at 154 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 155 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 158 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 125 n.9.
Id.
See id. at 125.
Id. at 126.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol45/iss3/2

20

Lewyn: How to Limit Gerrymandering
HOW TO LIMIT GERRYMANDERING

these policy determinations is "of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion." The first merely recognizes that nonpartisan gerrymanders in fact are aimed at guaranteeing rather than infringing fair
group representation. The second, which is not a preference for
proportionality per se but a preference for a level of parity between votes and representation sufficient to ensure that significant
minority voices are heard and that majorities are not consigned to
minority status, is hardly an illegitimate extrapolation from our
general majoritarian ethic and the objective of fair and adequate
representation recognized in Reynolds v. Sims."W

b. Constitutionality of the Indiana Plan
After resolving justiciability, the plurality should have decided whether
partisan geriymandering could be unconstitutional, because "the holding
that a constitutional claim presents a justiciable question does not carry the
consequence that the claim has any validity on the merits.''. Instead,
the plurality plunged directly "into the specifics of the adjudication of
gerrymandering claims."'6 Thus, the plurality appears to have assumed
that if political gerrymandering is justiciable, it must be unconstitutional if
it consistently degrades the minority party's power. 63 The plurality began its discussion by noting that in Bandemer, as in racial gerrymandering
cases, "plaintiffs were required to prove both intentional discrimination
against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect
on that group."'" The plurality found it unnecessary to discuss the issue
of discriminatory intent in detail, stating that "[a]s long as redistricting is
done by a legislature, it should not be very difficult to prove that the
likely political consequences of the reapportionment were intended"'6 5
and that the record therefore supported the district court's finding that the

160. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 125 n.9 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
161. Daniel H. Lowenstein, Bandemer's Gap: Gerrymandering and Equal Protection, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING, supra note 8, at 64, 74. For example, the Court could have ruled that although partisan gerrymandering was justiciable. it was not permitted by the Equal Protection Clause.
Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. By contrast, the concurrences were somewhat more careful. Justice O'Connor did not
divide her opinion into "constitutionality" and "justiciability" sections, but did state that "no group
right to an equal share of political power was ever intended by the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 147 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice Powell argued
that gerrymandering implicated the Equal Protection Clause because the "[c]lause guarantees citizens
that their State will govern them impartially." Id. at 166 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
164. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 127 (plurality opinion).
165. Id. at 129 (plurality opinion).
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state intentionally discriminated against Indiana Democrats."
However, the plurality rejected the district court's holding that the
Indiana redistricting plan's discriminatory effects were sufficient to violate
equal protection. 67 At the start of its discriminatory effects discussion,
the plurality noted that the Court's racial gerrymandering cases "clearly
foreclose any claim that the Constitution requires proportional representa68
tion."
The plurality went on to hold that "unconstitutional discrimination
occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will
consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process as a whole."'' 69 Under this test, plaintiffs may not prevail by
showing "the mere lack of proportional representation."' 71 Just as racial
gerrymandering plaintiffs were required to prove both disproportionate
results and "strong indicia of lack of political power and the denial of fair
representation,"' 7' political gerrymandering plaintiffs were required to
show "a history (actual or projected) of disproportionate results ... in
[connection] with similar indicia."' 72 Although disproportionate results in
one election did not constitute a history of disproportionate results,
"[p]rojected election returns based on district boundaries and past voting
patterns may certainly support this type of claim, even where no election
has yet been held under the challenged districting." 173
The plurality found that the district court's findings (which were based
primarily on 1982 election results)' were insufficient to satisfy the consistent degradation test, because "[r]elying on a single election to prove
unconstitutional discrimination is unsatisfactory."'7 The plurality reasoned that there was no reason to hold that the 1982 election results "were
a reliable prediction of future ones, 176 where the district court (1) expressly declined to so hold, (2) declined to hold the 1982 election results
"were the predictable consequence of the [gerrymander],'
(3) did not
find that the Democrats could never take control of the state legislature,
(4) did not consider the possibility (raised by the state on appeal) "that

166. Id. at 127 (plurality opinion).
167. See id. at 129-30 (plurality opinion).
168. Id. at 130 (plurality opinion).
169. Id. at 132 (plurality opinion).
170. Id. (plurality opinion). The plurality later noted that even if this test was satisfied, the state
would be allowed to show its redistricting had "valid underpinnings." Id. at 141 (plurality opinion).
171. Id. at 139 (plurality opinion).
172. Id. at 139-40 (plurality opinion).
173. Id. at 139 n.17 (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original).
174. Id. at 134 (plurality opinion).
175. Id. at 135 (plurality opinion).
176. Id. (plurality opinion).
177. Id. (plurality opinion).
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had the Democratic candidates received an additional few percentage
points of the votes cast statewide, they would have obtained a majority of
the seats in both houses,"'" and (5) made no finding that the 1981 redistricting "would consign the Democrats to a minority status in the Assembly throughout the 1980s or that the Democrats would have no hope of
doing any better in the reapportionment that would occur after the 1990
census."' 79 The plurality held that without such findings, the disproportionate results of the 1982 elections were inadequate to support a finding
that the Democrats' influence had been consistently degraded. 8 °
Justice Powell's dissent rejected the plurality's "consistent degradation" test. 8' Justice Powell agreed with the plurality that plaintiffs were
required to prove both discriminatory intent and discriminatory effect,'
and also agreed with the plurality's repudiation of proportional representation.'83 However, Justice Powell stated that the plurality's test failed
to provide adequate guidance to legislators and lower courts,"s and was
inconsistent with racial gerrymandering cases (which, according to Justice
Powell, held that a plan passed with a discriminatory purpose could be
struck down even if only one election had been held under the challenged
85
plan).
Justice Powell endorsed Justice Stevens' concurrence in Karcher,
which suggested that gerrymandering plaintiffs should be required to offer
proof concerning various factors, including the shapes of voting districts,
adherence to political subdivision boundaries, the nature of the legislative
procedures by which a redistricting law was enacted, legislative history
regarding the state's intent, evidence of population disparities between
districts (if any), and statistics showing vote dilution.'86 Justice Powell
added that "[n]o one [of these] factor[s] should be dispositive."' 87 In
sum, Justice Powell's test "requires consideration of all the circumstances

178. Id. (plurality opinion).
179. Id. at 135-36 (plurality opinion).
180. Id. at 136 (plurality opinion). The plurality went on to criticize the district court's emphasis
on the creation of multimember districts which were designed to be dominated by Republicans, because such districts are "indistinguishable from safe Republican ... single-member districts ...[and
their existence] in no way bolsters the contention that there has been statewide discrimination against
Democratic voters." Id. (plurality opinion).
181. See id. at 161-62 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182. Id. at 161 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
183. Id. at 169 n.7 (Powell, J..
concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, Justice Powell
rejected the plurality's suggestion that supporters of a losing candidate are "usually deemed to be
adequately represented by the winning candidate." Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting id. at 132 (plurality opinion)).
184. Id. at 171-72 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
185. Id. at 171 n.10 (Powell J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
186. Id. at 173 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
187. Id. (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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surrounding the plan.., to determine if a constitutional violation has occurred."' 88 Even if plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of unconstitutional gerrymandering, a state could "justify the discriminatory impact
of the [redistricting] plan by showing that the plan had a rational basis in
permissible neutral criteria."' 89
Justice Powell wrote that under his test, the district court's findings
were "well-grounded""' because (1) "the procedures used in redistricting
Indiana were carefully designed to exclude Democrats from participating
in the legislative process,"'' (2) the Indiana redistricting plans ignored
political subdivisions, 9 2 (3) legislative leaders "openly acknowledged
that their goal was to disadvantage Democratic voters,"'93 (4) district
boundaries were "irrational" rather than compact,'94 (5) the legislature
created multimember districts wherever "their winner-take-all aspects can
best be employed to debase Democratic voting strength,"' 95 and (6) the
Indiana redistricting plans "debased the effectiveness"'9 6 of Democratic
votes, because there was an unusually large gap between the Democrats'
share of the statewide popular vote and their share of legislative seats."'
c. Will Bandemer Survive the Rehnquist Court?
Of the nine Justices who decided Bandemer, only Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor remain on the
Court. Thus, it is possible that the Rehnquist Court will overrule
Bandemer. For the reasons stated below, I believe that Bandemer will be
upheld based on pre-Bandemer case law.
(1) Justiciability
As noted above, Baker listed numerous reasons why an issue might be
a nonjusticiable "political question."'98 Two of these criteria were contested in Bandemer:'99 whether there were "judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving" 2" gerrymandering claims, and

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 173 n.13 (Powell, J.. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 184 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 185 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 175 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 176-77 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 177 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 178 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 180 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 181 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 182-83 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Baker. 369 U.S. at 217. cited in Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 121 (plurality opinion).
Bandenmer, 478 U.S. at 121-24.
Id. at 121 (quoting Baker 369 U.S. at 217).
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whether gerrymandering clain's required "an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." ''
Admittedly, the Bandemer plurality's consistent degradation test is
probably too vague to be manageable without some clarification by future
courts. While the Bandemer rule may be judicially unmanageable in
its present form, scholars have created a wide variety of rules, including
the "bipartisan compromise" rule proposed in this article, which could be
applied to gerrymandering claims.
As to the illegitimate policy determination prong of Baker, Justice
O'Connor suggested that the Bandemer majority made two illegitimate
policy determinations: its preference for "nonpartisan as opposed to partisan gerrymanders" and its "preference for proportionality."2 3 However,
both policy determinations are analogous to policy determinations made in
other constitutional cases. The Bandemer plurality's preference for "nonpartisan over partisan" gerrymanders is analogous to its preference for
nonracial gerrymanders or prominority "affirmative" racial gerrymanders
over antiminority racial gerrymanders."° In both racial and political cases, the Court prefers one type of gerrymander to another, because of a
policy determination that a gerrymander designed to assure proportionality
(either by race or by political party) is less odious than one designed to
favor one race or political party.'05
Therefore, the Court's "preference for proportionality" in Bandemer is
analogous to its preference for proportionality in racial gerrymandering
cases. Justice O'Connor concedes that in the latter type of case, any possible test "must make some reference, even if only a loose one, to the relation between the minority group's share of the electorate and its share of
the elected representatives." 2'
Allan Moore has suggested that gerrymandering cases implicate three
other political question factors cited in Baker.2°7 First, Moore suggests
that "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department"' can be found in Article I's provision
that Congress is "the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of

201. Id. (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
202. Cf. id. at 123 (suggesting that lower courts could clarify law).
203. Id. at 125 n.9.
204. See United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165-66 (1977) (upholding redistricting designed to increase the number of minority legislators). But cf. Sha, 113 S. Ct. at 2824-25, 2827 (limiting legislative power to enact "affirmative" gerrymanders).
205. Cf Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824 (stating that classifications solely based on race are "by their
very nature odious").
206. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 156-57 (O'Connor, J.. concurring).
207. Moore. supra note 10, at 992-93.
208. Baker. 369 U.S. at 217.
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its own Members,"2 "9 Article I's provision that the states have analogous
powers subject to congressional preemption, 210 and the Tenth
Amendment's provision that powers not delegated to the federal government are reserved to the states. " ' One person, one vote disputes, like
gerrymandering cases, affect congressional elections. It logically follows
that if the Constitution commits all election-related issues to Congress and
the state legislatures, one person, one vote cases (and racial gerrymandering cases as well) would be nonjusticable. Thus, Moore's argument that
gerrymandering disputes are committed to other political departments is
foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. 22
Second, Moore argues that gerrymandering disputes risk "the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question, 2 3 if "one looks at redistricting and reapportionment legislation not as a problem but as the legislative branch's attempt to improve the system of representation. 2 4 As the one person,
one vote cases also involve redistricting, this argument also proves too
much.
Third, Moore argues that because gerrymandering litigation might
"transform the nature of political representation"2 1 5 and destabilize the
political system, adjudication of gerrymandering disputes would require
the courts to express "lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government ' 2 and contravene "an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made." ' 7 However, the one person,
one vote cases were far more destabilizing than Bandemer, as they "required most states to amend their constitution and virtually every state to
reapportion. ' By contrast, many states do not enact partisan gerrymanders, and Moore admits some of the proposed standards for adjudicating
gerrymanders are so lenient that they would affect very few partisan
districting plans.2" 9 Thus, it appears that adjudication of partisan gerry209. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
210. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 4. cl. 1.
211. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
212. See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders. 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (applying the one person. one vote rule to
congressional districting). Indeed, even more egregious misconduct would be nonjusticiable if Moore's
theory is applied. For example. suppose Texas passes a law saying "no one of Mexican descent can
vote in a congressional election." If only Congress can judge disputes related in any way to congressional elections, the validity of Texas' law would be a nonjusticiable political question.
213. Moore, supra note 10, at 993 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
214. Id. Furthermore, gerrymanders are hardly a nonpartisan attempt to improve the system of
representation.
215. Id.
216. Baker. 369 U.S. at 217.
217. Id.
218. Low-Beer. supra note 5, at 184 n.96.
219. Moore, supra note 10, at 996-97 (discussing Badham v. March Fong Eu. 694 F. Supp. 664
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mandering cases affects none of the political question factors cited in
Baker, and that political gerrymandering cases should be justiciable.
(2) Constitutionality
The Bandemer plurality, as noted above, did not fully explain why
egregious partisan gerrymandering was unconstitutional.' Thus, it is
difficult to say whether Bandemer correctly decided this question."2 '
Nevertheless, I shall try to explain some of the arguments the plurality
could have used if it had addressed the question, and then discuss the case
against a proposed constitutional antigerrymandering rule.
Legislative discriminations which violate equal protection generally
fall into three categories: (1) a classification which has no rational relationship to a legitimate state policy; (2) a classification which discriminates on the basis of a suspect or quasi-suspect classification such as race,
alienage or gender; or (3) a classification which burdens a fundamental
right as to a particular group, but does not burden other individuals or
groups in a similar manner. 2 Each of these prongs of equal protection
doctrine will be addressed in turn.
(a) Rationality
As a rule, legislative classifications must rationally relate to a legitimate state purpose.' Justices Powell and Stevens stated that the Equal
' and if a
Protection Clause "requires every State to govern impartially,"224
state's election rules "serve no purpose other than to favor one segment.., of the community, they violate the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection."' Thus, Justices Powell and Stevens may believe that
favoring one political party is not a legitimate state purpose, and gerrymandering is therefore unconstitutional.
Some language in the Bandemer plurality opinion supports application
of the rationality test to partisan gerrymandering. The plurality explained
that "[i]f there were a discriminatory effect and a discriminatory intent,

(N.D. Cal. 1988), affd mem.. 488 U.S. 1024 (1989)).
220. See supra text accompanying note 161.
221. One's opinion of Bandemer is dependent on one's views about fundamental constitutional
questions which are beyond the scope of this essay, such as the issue of how much weight courts
should give to the views of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.
222. Lowenstein. supra note 161, at 78.
223. TRIBE, supra note 36, § 16.2.
224. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 748-49 (Stevens. J., concurring); accord Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 166
(Powell. J.. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
225. Karcher,462 U.S. at 748 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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then the legislation would be examined for valid underpinnings. '226 The
plurality went on to state that "evidence of valid and invalid configuration
would be relevant to whether the districting plan met legitimate state interests. '' 2 Thus, the plurality appears to believe that partisan manipulation
of boundary lines is not a legitimate state interest, and that an egregious
gerrymander is therefore irrational.
Admittedly, the plurality made it clear that partisan discrimination
would be constitutional unless it was so egregious that it consistently
degraded228- the minority party's strength-a rule that seems hard to
square with the rationality test, because if gerrymandering is not justified
by any legitimate state interest, even a mild gerrymander should be irrational and therefore unconstitutional. On the other hand, it could be argued
that even under a rationality test, a test is needed to screen frivolous
claims where, as in Bandemer, the challenged legislation does not facially
discriminate against a group.
In sum, under a rationality test, gerrymandering plaintiffs could prevail
by showing a redistricting plan (1) in fact favors one political party, and
(2) was enacted for illegitimate, discriminatory reasons. Except for the
Bandemer plurality's holding that small, transitory discriminatory effects
did not render a districting plan unconstitutional, 22 9 this two-step test
seems consistent with the Bandemer opinion.
It could be argued that gerrymandering itself serves a legitimate state
purpose because while other forms of discrimination are "brand[s] of
bigotry and ethnocentrism ...discrimination against an opposing political
interest is generally reasoned and policy-minded." 230 This argument requires courts to decide whether partisan gerrymandering is an unmitigated
evil or a legitimate state purpose. For the reasons stated earlier in this
article,23' the courts will probably continue to hold that gerrymandering
is illegitimate. Furthermore, other forms of gerrymandering, such as racial
gerrymandering, may also be reasoned and policy-minded. If ethnic groups
differ ideologically (for example, if blacks favor higher taxes and whites
favor lower taxes) racial gerrymandering is just as reasoned and policyminded as partisan gerrymandering.232

226. Bandemer. 478 U.S. at 141 (plurality opinion).
227. Id. (plurality opinion).
228. Id. at 132 (plurality opinion).
229. Id. at 139-40 (plurality opinion).
230. Moore, supra note 10, at 998.
231. See supra notes 18-33 and accompanying text (describing policy arguments against gerrymandering).
232. Cf Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black
Electoral Success, 89 MICK. L. REV. 1077, 1129 (1991) (stating that blacks are "ideologically homogenous on many issues").
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It could also be argued that the Bandemer plurality's extensive discussion of the Indiana redistricting plans is inconsistent with rationality review, because the rationality test is ordinarily highly deferential.23 However, in recent decades the Court has begun to apply rationality review in
a less deferential mannerY For instance, the Court has used rationality
review to strike down state laws which restrict group homes for the mentally retarded,s deny free public education to the children of illegal
aliens, 6 distribute income from natural resources to residents based upon the year in which their residency was established, 7 and grant tax exemptions for Vietnam Veterans who did reside in the state before the end
of the war. 8 Thus, the Court may apply a "rationality with bite"
standard to gerrymandering casesY 9
(b) Suspect classifications
Where a state law is premised on a suspect classification, that law may
be struck down even if rationally based. Laws affecting suspect classifications are subject to strict judicial scrutiny, under which the state has the
burden of proving "that it has [a] compelling interest justifying the law
and that distinctions created by [the] law are necessary to further some
governmental purpose." 2" The courts have held that suspect classifications include classifications based on race, national origin, or alienage.24'
Similarly, laws affecting quasi-suspect classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny, under which a law will be struck down unless the classification bears substantial relationship to an important government interest.24 2 The courts hold that quasi-suspect classifications include classifications based on gender or illegitimacy.243
It has been argued that Bandemer "implicates the 'suspect
classification' branch of equal protection doctrine," 2' for three reasons.

233. Cf. Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959) (stating that a court that applies the
rationality test will uphold any classification based "upon a state of facts that reasonably can be conceived to constitute a distinction").
234. TRIBE, supra note 36, § 16-3, at 1444-45.
235. City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
236. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
237. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
238. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985).
239. Cf. TRIBE, supra note 36, § 16.3. at 1445 (criticizing "covert use under the minimum rationality label" of heightened scrutiny).
240. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (6th ed. 1990).
241. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3, at 576 (4th ed.
1991).
242. Id.

243. Id.
244. Lowenstein, supra note 161, at 80.
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First, the plurality relied primarily on "racial gerrymandering cases, and
the only cases cited in which the constitutional claims were upheld were
'
cases of discrimination against racial minority groups." 45
Second, the
plurality structured its analysis "around the requirements of intent to discriminate and discriminatory effect. . . constitutional standards that have
grown up around the concept of suspect classifications. '4 6 Third, the
plurality's consistent degradation test is similar to the rule that a districting
plan is an unconstitutional racial gerrymander only if plaintiffs establish "a
substantially greater showing
of adverse effects than a mere lack of pro'2 47
portional representation.
The Bandemer plurality stated that evidence regarding district configurations was "relevant to whether the districting plan met legitimate state
interests." '48 Thus, the plurality seems to suggest that gerrymandering is
subject to the rationality test, because under rationality review a state may
prevail by establishing a legitimate purpose for its acts. 49 Furthermore,
in Shaw,"0 a later case, the Court stated in dictum that "nothing in our
case law compels the conclusion that racial and political gerrymanders are
' The Court, howsubject to precisely the same constitutional scrutiny."251
ever, did not fully explain the difference between the two types of gerrymanders, nor did it explicitly repudiate the idea that political minorities
are suspect or quasi-suspect classes. It is therefore unclear whether
Bandemer implicates the "suspect classification" branch of equal protection doctrine.
It is also unclear whether major political parties are a suspect class
under pre-Bandemer case law. A classification is suspect when it affects a
class which "(1) ... suffer[s] a history of discrimination; (2) exhibit[s]
obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a
discrete group; and (3) show[s] that they are a minority or politically
powerless.2 5 2 In addition, strict scrutiny has been reserved for classi'
fications that "tend to be irrelevant to any proper legislative goal."253
Quasi-suspect classifications are those which "give rise to recurring consti-

245. Id.
246. Id. at 81.
247. Bandemer. 478 U.S. at 131 (plurality opinion).
248. Id. at 141 (plurality opinion).
249. Under strict scrutiny the classification must serve a compelling governmental interest. Plyler
v. Doe. 457 U.S. 202, 216-17, 217 n.15 (1982). Under intermediate scrutiny the classification must
serve a substantial governmental interest. Id. at 217-18, 218 n.16.
250. 113 S.Ct. at 2816.
251. Id. at 2828.
252. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir. 1990)
(stating that homosexuals are not a suspect class).
253. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217 n.14.
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tutional difficulties" 4 and affect "a class which shares some of the characteristics of the suspect classes." 5
For several reasons, it could also be argued that even if minor political
groups are suspect classes, 6 major political parties are not. First, Justice
O'Connor has argued that Democrats and Republicans are not politically
powerless, nor have they suffered a history of discrimination. Indeed,
Democrats and Republicans "are the dominant groups ... [in] the political
process.""as 7 Even though major parties are occasionally excluded from
redistricting, "the degree to which certain racial and ethnic groups have
historically been excluded from the political process is *holly incomparable to the degree to which political parties and other groups have, at one
time or another, been excluded. ' ' "s
Admittedly, neither party is perpetually powerless in most states. On
the other hand, one party is often powerless at any given point in
time," and America does have a long history of political discrimination.
Thus, 'the dispositive issue should be whether strict scrutiny is required
where two groups alternate in oppressing each other. For example, if in
state X (over a period of several decades) blacks and whites alternate in
power, and each group enacts racial gerrymanders which succeed in keeping the other party out of power for ten or twenty years, is either group a
suspect class?
The Supreme Court has answered this question by repeatedly stating
that "equal protection analysis is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefitted by a particular classification." 2" In Shaw,26 ' the
Court held that a redistricting plan designed to segregate the races might
be unconstitutional even if the plan affected both races equally, 262 because the plan affected the suspect classification of race. Similarly, in City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,263 a majority of the Court held that an
affirmative action plan which discriminated against whites was subject to
strict scrutiny.2' If an ordinarily powerful, but temporarily powerless ra254. Id. at 217.
255. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne. 726 F.2d 191, 196 (5th Cir. 1984), afrd in
part and vacated in part,473 U.S. 432 (1985).
256. See Lowenstein. supra note 161, at 83 (suggesting that political gerrymandering is suspect
only if it affects "a political group suffering pervasive discrimination").
257. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 152 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
258. Moore, supra note 10, at 998.
259. See, e.g., Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 113-14 (stating that the Democrats were politically powerless at the time of gerrymandering).
260. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2829 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494
(1989)).
261. Id. at 2816.
262. Id. at 2829.
263. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
264. Id. at 495 (plurality opinion). Although only four Justices joined in the plurality opinion, one
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cial group is powerless for purposes of strict scrutiny analysis, it should
follow that a temporarily powerless political group is also powerless and
that discrimination against that group may be subject to heightened scrutiny.
On the other hand, Justice O'Connor's Bandemer concurrence argued
that race is distinguishable from partisanship because "while membership
in a racial group 'is an immutable characteristic, voters can-and often
do-move from one party to the other or support candidates for both
parties."265 Although partisanship, unlike race, is not immutable, alienage, which is a suspect classification,2" is also mutable, because aliens
may eventually qualify for citizenship. An alien, however, must wait several years to qualify for citizenship, while voters and politicians can easily
switch parties.
In sum, it is unlikely that Bandemer and pre-Bandemer law support a
holding that partisanship is a suspect or quasi-suspect classification. The
Bandemer plurality opinion contains language which seems to support a
rationality test, and Shaw states that racial gerrymandering is subject to
stricter scrutiny than political gerrymandering. Nevertheless, minority
parties are frequently discriminated against, and are powerless at the time
of a gerrymander. Thus, it is still possible to make the argument that partisanship is a suspect classification.
(c) Fundamental rights
Strict scrutiny is also applicable when governmental action affects a
fundamental right,267 such as voting. It could therefore be argued that
gerrymandering violates a group's fundamental right to fair and effective
"
representation. 68
For example, Justice Powell has suggested that "the constitutional
mandate of 'fair and effective representation' "269 bars discrimination in
redistricting. Similarly, the Bandemer plurality, noted that the one person.
one vote cases indicate "the justiciability of claims going to the adequacy
of representation in state legislatures. 270
However, the fair and effective representation theory has at least two

of the concurring Justices agreed that discrimination against whites was subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at
520 (Scalia. J.,
concurring).
265. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 156 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
266. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 241, at 576.
267. See TRIBE, supra note 36, at § 16-10.
268. Some commentators have suggested gerrymandering violates an individual's "right to be free
of governmental tampering with one's vote." Polsby & Popper. supra note 18. at 324; see also LowBeer. supra note 5, at 164 (referring to an individual's "right to an equally meaningful vote").
269. Karcher,462 U.S. at 788 (Powell, J.. dissenting).
270. Bandeiner, 478 U.S. at 124 (plurality opinion).
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drawbacks. First, the idea of a right to fair and effective representation is
based on a misreading of Reynolds v. Sims.27 According to Justice
Powell, Reynolds requires "a State to seek to achieve through redistricting
'fair and effective representation for all citizens.' "272 The phrase "fair
and effective representation" comes from the Reynolds Court's statement
that:
[T]he concept of equal protection has been traditionally viewed as
requiring the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same
relation to the governmental action questioned or challenged. With
respect to the allocation of legislative representation, all voters, as
citizens of a State, stand in the same relation regardless of where
they live. Any suggested criteria for the differentiation of citizens
are insufficient to justify any discrimination, as to the weight of
their votes, unless relevant to the permissible purposes of legislative apportionment. Since the achieving of fair and effective representation for all citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative
apportionment, we conclude that the Equal Protection Clause
guarantees the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in
the election of state legislators. 3
According to the Reynolds Court, fair and effective representation is
not an independent constitutional right, but a purpose of legislative apportionment which justifies otherwise impermissible discrimination.274
Fair and effective representation also implies that there is some ideal,
therefore constitutionally required, form of representation. Thus, a right to
fair and effective representation might require the Court to mandate a
particular electoral system. A constitutionally mandated electoral system is
a far more radical idea than any intended by the Bandemer Court, the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, or most commentators. By contrast, an antigerrymandering rule based on a rationality or suspect classification theory would merely require the Court to reject blatant unfairness,
instead of forcing it to define fairness.275

271. 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that malapportioned state legislatures violate equal protection).
272. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 166-67 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 533 ).
273. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565-66.
274. Id.; see also Lowenstein, supra note 161. at_.72-73 (making the argument in more detail).
275. See Shapiro, supra note 28, at 228-29 (stating that the Court has historically defined unfairness without defining fairness).
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(d) Constitutional arguments againstprohibiting gerrymandering

It could'be argued that even if partisan gerrymanders should be justiciable, the Bandemer plurality erred in creating a group right to be free
from vote dilution because (1) the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment

did not expect it to affect gerrymandering, and (2) the Fourteenth Amendment protects individual rather than group rights.
(i) The framers' intent
Justice O'Connor has pointed out that "no group right to an equal
share of political power was ever intended by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment." 76 By contrast, the Court's prohibition of racial gerrymandering is justified by the framers' intent to prohibit racial discrimination. 7 The other Bandemer opinions did not deny that gerrymandering existed at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment or
that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were not concerned about
the issue.278 Indeed, it has been argued that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not intend to protect voting rights at all.2 9 The Supreme
Court, however, has rarely considered the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment in redistricting-related cases.2 " Thus, it is unlikely the Court
will use such arguments to overrule Bandemer.
Furthermore, the Court is especially willing to go beyond the framers'
understanding of the Constitution where the social and legal conditions
supporting the framers' intent have changed over time.28 In a gerryman-

276. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 147 (O'Connor, J.. concurring).
277. Id. at 151 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
278. Id. at 147 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
279. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 152-209 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (questioning application of the Fourteenth Amendment to voting): Sanford
Levinson, Gertymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional Representation: Why
Won't It Go Away?. 33 UCLA L. REV. 257, 268-69 n.43 (1985) (suggesting that if the Fourteenth
Amendment protects voting, then the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments become superfluous). But
see Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 250-78 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that
the historical record is imprecise); William W. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right"
to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirry-Ninth Congress, ii 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 33 (Philip B.
Kurland ed.) (criticizing Justice Harlan's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's legislative history).
280. Levinson. supra note 279, at 271-72 n.52 (asking "Iwihy should intent suddenly matter now
when it has been so blithely ignored in so many other voting cases?").
281. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483. 489-93 (1954) (construing the Fourteenth
Amendment to forbid racial segregation of public schools despite the Amendment's "inconclusive"
history, because public schools are far more important and blacks are far more educated than at the
time of the Amendment); cf Tennessee v. Garner. 471 U.S. 1. 13-15 (1985) (holding that the use of
deadly force to apprehend a fleeing felon is not always reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. because at time of the Amendment the term "felony" was limited to dangerous capital crimes, a condition which is no longer true).
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dering case, the Court's own rulings are such a changed condition because
the one person, one vote rule made gerrymandering easier in two ways.
First, the one person, one vote cases ensured that redistricting occurred
every ten years, thereby increasing legislators' opportunity to gerrymander.282 Second, the one person, one vote rule prevented states from relying on their own barriers to gerrymandering, such as their constitutional
requirements that districts be compact and not split political subdivisions."8 3 It could be argued that an antigerrymandering rule is necessary
to correct the consequences of the Court's one person, one vote rule and
that the Court should therefore go beyond the framers' intent.
Finally, it has been argued that courts should rely on the framers'
understanding of the Constitution because if judges are limited by the
Constitution's history, then the people will be able to decide
nonconstitutional issues through their elected representatives." This argument is entitled to less weight where legislators have elected themselves
through gerrymandering,, just as it would be entitled to no weight if the
legislators had elected themselves by stuffing ballot boxes.
(ii) Individual vs. group rights
Justice O'Connor wrote that allowing group vote dilution claims
would collapse the " 'fundamental distinction between state action that
inhibits an individual's right to vote and state action that affects the political strength of various groups that compete for leadership in a democratically governed community.' "285 It could be argued, however, that individual and group rights are interrelated; for instance, an individual's right
to vote is useful only because it helps elect a representative.
Furthermore, even Justice O'Connor endorses a group right to be free
of racial gerrymandering. Admittedly, Justice O'Connor tries to distinguish
the racial gerrymandering cases from group vote dilution cases on a variety of grounds. First, she argues that the history of the Equal Protection
Clause gives the federal courts "greater warrant ... to intervene for protection against racial discrimination." '86 It does not follow, however, that

282. See Browdy, supra note 51, at 1381.
283. See Anderson, supra note 12, at 1573; Low-Beer, supra note 5, at 173.
284. See RAOUL BERGER. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICtARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 370 (1977) ("If the Court may substitute its own meaning for that of the Framers it may... rewrite the Constitution without limit."); Lino A. Graglia, "Interpreting" the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1026 (1992) (stating that "[t]he function of originalism
is to minimize the conflict between judicial review and democracy").
285. Bandemer 478 U.S. at 150-51 (O'Connor, J.. concurring) (quoting Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55, 83 (1980) (Stevens. J., concurring)).
286. Id. at 151 (O'Connor, J., concurring). A related argument is that "ethnic and racial minorities
are largely ghettoized; the organic development of their communities establishes ... those communi-
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the Equal Protection Clause gives the courts no warrant to intervene
against other forms of group discrimination. Second, Justice O'Connor
states that vote dilution analysis "is far less manageable when extended to
major political parties than if confined to racial minority groups," 287 because the courts will have to adjudicate competing claims of several
groups. However, the Bandemer test may be easier for a state to satisfy
than the law of racial vote dilution because Bandemer forbids only those
redistricting plans motivated by discriminatory intent. 288 Third, Justice
O'Connor states that "the difficulty of measuring voting strength is heightened in the case of a major political party ' 289 because voters "can-and
often do-move from one party to the other or support candidates from
both parties. '29" However, there are numerous ways of ascertaining
parties' voting strength, some of which have been discussed by courts.29
Justice O'Connor has also stated that an individual voter is not harmed
by the diminution of a party's statewide influence, because the voter cannot vote for candidates in other districts. She explains that "[o]n the
Court's reasoning, members of a political party in one State should be
able to challenge a congressional districting plan adopted in any other
state, on the grounds that their party is unfairly represented in that State's
congressional delegation, thus injuring them as members of the national
party. 292 The same argument could be used to support racial gerrymandering, because a racial gerrymander dilutes a racial group's statewide
strength just as a partisan gerrymander dilutes a party's statewide strength.
In sum, it appears that Bandemer is unlikely to be overruled, unless
the Court's attitude towards gerrymandering changes radically. Although it
is not clear what level of scrutiny, under the Equal Protection Clause, will
be used to review politically based gerrymandering, the Court's dicta in
Bandemer and in racial gerrymandering cases suggests that the Court will
probably apply a rationality test, but will give gerrymanders more scrutiny
than most classifications are given under rationality review.

ties as natural units deserving of representation." Moore, supra note 10, at 998. This argument actually
supports a broad antigerrymandering rule, because it suggests that all geographically compact (or
"ghettoized") communities should be protected from gerrymandering.
287. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 156 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
288. See Thornburg v. Gingles. 478 U.S. 30, 44 (1986) (noting that the "intent test" for racial vote
dilution was repudiated by the Voting Rights Act).
289. Bandenmer, 478 U.S. at 156 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
290. Id. (O'Connor, J.. concurring).
291. See, e.g., Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634, 655-60 (N.D. I11.1991) (discussing varying ways of determining parties' voting strength).
292. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 153 (O'Connor. J.. concurring).
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5. Case Law Interpreting Davis v. Bandemer
Although Bandemer lacked a majority opinion, the lower courts have
generally applied the plurality opinion because it "provides the 'narrowest
grounds' for decision."293 Courts in at least seven cases have applied
Bandemer to partisan gerrymandering claims.
The first such case, Badham v. March Fong Eu,2 a upheld
California's 1982 congressional districting plan, a Democratic plan which
"many... believed to be the most egregious gerrymander of the decade."295 Under this plan, "[Ft]hree sets of Republican incumbents were

paired, and one particular Republican incumbent's district was split into
'
six pieces."296
Before the 1982 plan,297 the Democrats had a one seat
lead in the California congressional delegation.298 By contrast, in the five

congressional elections held under the challenged plan, the Democrats'
won 60% of all congressional elections2 even though they won only
52.2% of the statewide two-party congressional vote.3"
The Badham court interpreted Bandemer to mean that even if gerrymandering plaintiffs proved " 'a history (actual or projected) of disproportionate results' "30 they were also required to prove " 'strong indicia of
lack of political power' and the denial of fair' representation."3 2 The
court found that the lack of political power requirement had not been met,
because (1) there was no evidence that Republican voters' views had been
ignored by Democratic U.S. Representatives,3 3 (2) there was no evidence of interference with California Republicans' First Amendment
rights,3" and (3) California Republicans were in fact a "potent... politi-

293. Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 955 n.22 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)); see also Badham v. March Fong Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 66869 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd mem., 488 U.S. 1024 (1989) (addressing the plurality opinion in Bandemer).
294. 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd mem., 488 U.S. 1024 (1989).
295. Bernard Grofman, An Expert Witness Perspective on Continuing and Emerging Voting Rights
Controversies: From One Person, One Vote to Partisan Gerrymandering,21 STETSON L. REv. 783,
816 (1992).
296. Id. at 811.
297. Frederick K. Lowell & Teresa A. Craigie, California'sReapportionment Struggle: A Classic
Clash Between Law and Politics,2 J.L. & POL. 245, 246 (1985).
298. Groftman, supra note 295. at 811 n.131.

299.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,

U.S.

DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNIT-

ED STATES 1988 at 243 (108th ed. 1988) [hereinafter 1988 ABSTRACT]; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1992 at 263 (112th ed. 1992)
[hereinafter 1992 ABSTRACT]. All percentages have been calculated by the author.
300. 1992 ABSTRACT. supra note 299. at 257: 1988 ABSTRACT, supra note 299. at 236.
301. Badham, 694 F. Supp. at 671 (quoting Bandemer. 478 U.S. at 139 (plurality opinion)).
302. Id. at 670 (quoting Bandemer 478 U.S. at 139 (plurality opinion)).
303. Id. at 670-71.
304. Id. at 670 (referring to absence of interference with Republican "registration, organizing,
voting fund-raising, or campaigning" and noting that "Republicans remain free to speak out on issues
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cal force"3 5 because they elected 40% of the state's congressional delegation, a governor, and a U.S. Senator." 6 The Badham decision was
summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court. 7 However, summary
affirmances are not binding authority.3 8 Thus, the Court's decision to
affirm Badham may reflect factors other than approval of the Badham
court's logic, such as "a lack of consensus ...[or a desire] to defer consideration until greater
attention could be devoted to the issue in the aca' 309
literature.
demic
Nevertheless, Badham has been cited to support the proposition that
"the only groups who might have a cause of action for political gerrymandering are essentially suspect classes, 'discrete and insular minorities'
whose political influence is minimal and whose exclusion from the political process is virtually complete. 31 0 For example, in Pope v. Blue,3 '
North Carolina Republicans challenged a congressional districting plan
which was allegedly a Democratic gerrymander. The court held that even
if the plaintiffs could prove a " 'projected history' of disproportionate results,"3" 2 plaintiffs could not prevail because they "do not allege, nor can
they, that the state's redistricting plan has caused them to be 'shut out of
the political process.' ,31In support of this holding, the court noted that
(1) a number of safe Republican districts were created by the Democrats'
redistricting plan, (2) plaintiffs did not allege the Republicans were precluded from influencing Democratic legislators, and (3) there were no
allegations anyone interfered with the Republicans' First Amendment
rights,3" 4 except insofar as the district's "distorted and elongated shapes"
interfered with all candidates' activities. 5 Pope was also summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court. 3 6 Like Badham, Pope seems to hold that
in the absence of First Amendment violations, a gerrymander against a
major political party is nearly always constitutional, since a viable minority party will usually have some safe districts.3"7
of public concern").
305. Id. at 672.
306. Id. at 672-73. The Court also rejected claims based on Article 1. Section 2 of the Constitution, the First Amendment, and the Guaranty Clause. Id. at 673-76.
307. Badham v. March Fong Eu, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989).
308. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 121 (plurality opinion).
309. Moore, supra note 10, at 997.
310. Id. at 997.
311. 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C.), aff'd mem., 113 S.Ct. 30 (1992).
312. Id. at 397.
313. Id.
314. Id. The court also rejected claims based on Art. I, § 2 of the Constitution. the First
Amendment, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 397-99.
315. Id. at 397.
316. Pope v. Blue, 113 S. Ct. 30 (1992).
317. Gerrymandering often requires the majority party to pack as many minority party supporters
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In Terrazas v. Slagle,"' a district court adopted an only slightly
broader interpretation of Bandemer. The Terrazas court upheld an alleged
Democratic gerrymander of the Texas congressional delegation, because
the Republicans were not excluded from the state's political process as a
whole.3" 9 In support of this finding, the court noted that the Republicans
won numerous statewide elections,320 elected 40% of the state's House of
" ' However,
Representatives, and chaired some legislative committees.32
the court rejected the Badham court's emphasis on the existence, or lack
thereof, of First Amendment violations, because "[g]errymandering is concerned with dilution of political influence through the manipulation of
elective district boundaries, not with other abuses of the electoral process
or First Amendment violations." 3"
Other cases interpret Bandemer more broadly. In Republican Party of
North Carolina v. Martin,3" North Carolina Republicans challenged the
state's method of electing trial court judges as a partisan gerrymander.
Under North Carolina law, judicial candidates were nominated "in local
party primaries held in each district, and thereafter, the successful primary
candidates from each district [ran] against each other in a general, statewide election. 324
Plaintiffs alleged that North Carolina's at-large system diluted Republican votes because Republican judicial candidates had won only one
election since 1900,"z even though they won 43% in 1986326 and 46%
in 1984327 of the statewide vote in contested races. The Fourth Circuit
found the plaintiffs stated a valid claim under Bandemer, for two reasons.
First, the plaintiffs alleged a history of disproportionate results, because
"consistency of voter habits combined with the geographical distribution
of party affiliation throughout the state renders it likely that [the
Democrats' dominance of judicial elections] will continue into the foreseeable future."328 Second, the plaintiffs' complaint showed that
not only are the election results disproportionate, but also that the

as possible in a particular district in order to keep them out of other districts. See supra note 8 and
accompanying text (describing "packing").
318. 821 F. Supp. 1162 (W.D. Tex. 1993).
319. Id. at 1174.
320. Id. at 1175 n.17.
321. Id. at 1174&n.15.
322. Id. at 1174.
323. 980 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1992).
324. Id. at 947.
325. Id. at 948.
326. Id. at 949 n.1l.
327. Id. at 949.
328. Id. at 956-57.
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because...

few Republicans will offer to run since the chance of success is
almost nonexistent ... [and] potential contributors are unwilling

to donate money or other resources to a candidate who is perceived to be an almost certain loser.329
The court admitted that Republicans were not barred from " 'the processes
by which candidates are nominated and elected,' "330 but added that Republican success in other statewide elections actually supported the
plaintiffs' claim, because the Republicans' statewide strength proved they
could elect judges under a more equitable districting system.33'
The court emphasized that its holding was "narrow and wholly dependent on the ...

alleged facts, including the unique claim of a near centu-

ry-long dearth of political diversity among superior court judges in North
Carolina and the certainty of a similar future. 332 Nevertheless, Martin
supports the proposition that a gerrymander is unconstitutional where it
results in grossly disproportionate results, and makes it difficult for the
minority party to attract contributors or candidates. Furthermore, Martin
squarely rejects the Badham and Pope courts' suggestion that minority
party success in elections unrelated to a gerrymander, such as elections for
senator or governor, may preclude a gerrymandering claim.
Other post-Bandemer case law is too narrow to be relevant to most
gerrymandering cases. Two district courts have rejected gerrymandering
claims where the plaintiffs' complaint was based solely on the fact that the
minority party's incumbents were disproportionately forced to run against
each other.333 Furthermore, another district court upheld a state house
apportionment plan favoring the Democrats where the plan "was a result
of a political compromise that allowed the Republicans to craft the Senate
apportionment plan while the Democrats fashioned the [house apportionment] plan.

334

In sum, post-Bandemer case law unanimously holds that plaintiffs in
gerrymandering cases may not rely solely on disproportionate results, and

329. Id. at 957.
330. Id. at 958 (quoting Bandenier. 478 U.S. at 137).
331. Id. at 957-58. The court went on to reject the plaintiffs' First Amendment claim. Id. at 95861.
332. Id. at 958.
333. See Illinois Legislative Redistricting Comm'n v. LaPaille, 782 F. Supp. 1272, 1276 (N.D. Ill.
1992) (noting that "there is no allegation that any [other] particular harm has already befallen the
Democrats"); Republican Party of Va. v. Wilder, 774 F. Supp. 400, 405-06 (W.D. Va. 1991) (pairing
of minority party incumbents alone is insufficient to support a motion for a preliminary injunction
against the redistricting plan).
334. See Fund for Accurate & Informed Representation v. Weprin. 796 F. Supp. 662. 669
(N.D.N.Y.), affid ner., 113 S.Ct. 650 (1992).
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must prove some sort of exclusion from the political process. 35 However, the lower courts are sharply divided as to the meaning of exclusion
from the political process. Under Martin, it appears that plaintiffs may
prevail if they can prove unusually disproportionate results and difficulty
in obtaining candidates or contributors. 36 The latter criterion should not
be difficult to meet, because a party with little chance of winning an election is unlikely to recruit its best possible candidates.337 By contrast, under Badham or Pope it is questionable whether a major political party can
ever prevail in the absence of a First Amendment violation.338 Similarly,

under Terrazas a major party can win a gerrymandering case only in a
one-party state where it completely lacks statewide political influence.339
Other post-Bandemer gerrymandering cases are so narrowly confined to
their facts that they are of little precedential value.
Im. DISCUSSION: THE SEARCH FOR STANDARDS
A. The Nature of the Problem
As noted above, lower courts are divided as to the proper interpretation of Bandemer. Indeed, Bandemer has "confounded legislators, practitioners, and academics alike. Some find the case internally incoherent;
others find a method to the madness."'
Most commentators34' agree
that the Bandemer plurality opinion fails to give "any real guidance to
lower courts forced to adjudicate"" gerrymandering cases.
Thus, it appears that lower courts have wide discretion to create a

335. See supra text accompanying notes 293-334.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 323-31.

337. Indeed, the minority party often will be unable to recruit candidates at all. For example, in
1990, 85 U.S. representatives were elected without any major party opposition. 1992 ABSTRACT, supra
note 299, at 256.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 294-317.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 318-22.
340. Edward Still. The Hunting of the Gerrymander, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1019, 1020 (1991) (reviewing POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING, supra note 8).
341. See Grofman, supra note 295, at 816 ("[A]s far as I am aware, I am one of only two people

who believe that Bandemer makes sense. Moreover, the other person, Daniel Lowenstein. has a diametrically opposed view as to what the plurality opinion means.").
342. TRIBE, supra note 36, at 1083; see also Charles Backstrom et al., Partisan Gerrymandering
in the Post-BandemerEra, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY 285, 304 (1987) (concluding the Bandemer plurality was "unable to devise a workable, practicable measure for gerrymandering"); Stephen S. Gottlieb,
Fashioning a Test for Gerrymandering, 15 J. LEGIS. 1, 7 (1988) (referring to the Court's "inability to
find any measure of gerrymandering short of a very high threshold"); Michael A. Hess, Beyond Justiciability: Political GerrymanderingAfter Davis v. Bandemer, 9 CAMPBELL L. REv. 207, 219 (1987)
(Bandemer "leaves unanswered a perplexing question: what are the applicable criteria for measuring
and adjudicating a political gerrymander?"); Moore, supra note 10, at 994 (referring to the plurality's
"confessed inability to articulate a meaningful and manageable standard"). But see Lowenstein, supra
note 161, at 115 n.49 (contending that Badham properly interpreted Bandemer).
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standard to determine when a redistricting plan is an unconstitutional
partisan gerrymander, as long as the standard is consistent with the
Bandemer plurality opinion and otherwise workable. By "workable" I
mean a standard that is simple enough to be applied by district court judges who are not highly skilled in mathematics, and does not lead to obviously absurd results.
B. A Proposed Test-The "BipartisanCompromise" Rule
1. Why a Bipartisan Compromise Rule?
In order to decide what sort of districting plan is unconstitutional, we
must first ask ourselves what sort of districting plan, other than proportional representation, would be constitutional under even the most
proplaintiff, antigerrymandering interpretation of Bandemer. One obvious
answer is a nonpartisan or bipartisan redistricting plan of the sort approved
in Gaffniey,343 because the drafters of a bipartisan plan most likely lack
discriminatory intent and are unlikely to draw a plan with severely discriminatory effects. However, even a nonpartisan plan is unlikely to
achieve proportional representation, because in a single-member district
system, "any additional votes [above 50%] that one party gets will first
make a difference in several marginal districts, tipping them more rapidly
into the majority party's column than the proportion by which that party's
statewide vote has risen." 3" The resulting gap between a party's vote
share3 45and its share of legislative seats is known as the "balloon effect.
Since the existence of a balloon effect does not render a redistricting
plan unconstitutional,346 the mild balloon effect caused by a bipartisan
plan would not be sufficiently severe to render such a plan unconstitutional. It follows that even a partisan plan should be upheld if its balloon
effect is as small as the balloon effect resulting from a bipartisan plan, and
that a partisan plan with a substantially larger balloon effect raises constitutional questions.
Accordingly, the courts should ordinarily uphold a redistricting plan if
it is produced through a bipartisan compromise,347 or yields actual or

343. 412 U.S. at 735.
344. Charles Backstrom et al., Establishing a Statewide Electoral Effects Baseline, in POLITICAL
GERRYMANDERING. supra note 8, at 145, 162. For example, if a presidential candidate wins 60% of
the popular vote, he or she will usually win at least 90% of the states. See 1992 ABSTRACT. supra note
299, at 251-52 (listing popular vote totals and state-by-state results for the 1948-88 presidential elections).
345. Backstrom et al., supra note 344. at 162.
346. See Banderner, 478 U.S. at 130 (plurality opinion).
347. Two examples of a bipartisan compromise are the consensus of a bipartisan commission, or a
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projected results which deviate from proportionality to roughly the same

extent as the results of a bipartisan compromise.
2. How the Test Would Work
a. In Theory
As noted above, it is obvious that any districting plan based on a
bipartisan compromise should be upheld,34 absent highly unusual circumstances." 9 A more difficult question is posed by a plan passed by a
one-party government."' If such a plan is challenged under my test, the
court would have to compare the plan's actual and projected results to

those of an actual or hypothetical bipartisan compromise plan. A plan's
future results may be projected by relying on the conventional wisdom
among politicians and the press35' or by examining expert testimony
based on prior election returns in the newly created districts.352 In addition, if one election has occurred under the plan, and the results did not
indicate an unusual partisan tide or were unusually close, then the court
could assume the results of the first election were typical.
Even if the past and likely future results of a redistricting plan are
clear, the court must also decide what results a bipartisan plan would have

compromise between a legislative chamber or chambers dominated by one party and a governor of
another.
348. See. e.g., Fund for Accurate & Informed Representation, Inc. v. Weprin. 796 F. Supp. 662
(N.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem. 113 S. Ct. 650 (1992) (upholding the alleged Democratic gerrymander of the
state house where the Republican state senate agreed to trade influence in one chamber for influence in
another).
349. One could imagine situations where one party could pass a gerrymander by attracting defectors from the other party. For example, if 54 of the 100 seats of State X's senate were held by Republicans, and the Democrats persuaded five Republicans to support a Democratic gerrymander by promising them the only five safe Republican seats, such a plan would hardly be bipartisan.
350. A "one party" government is one in which the governor and both legislative chambers belong
to the same political party.
351. Bandemer 478 U.S. at 128 (plurality opinion) (politicians usually know the "likely political
composition of the new districts"); see also Redistricting in the States, CONG. Q. SPEC. REP., Feb. 29,
1992, at 12 (describing likely results of redistricting in various states).
1991) (choosing one
352. See, e.g., Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. I11.
congressional redistricting plan over another based on expert testimony as to the likely partisan balance). The court in Hastert discussed expert testimony predicting a plan's results by analyzing the
district-by-district results of an election in which voting turned on party affiliation rather than issues or
candidate personalities. Id. at 657. The court referred to this election as a "base line race." Id. Under
this method of analysis the results of the base line race are used to predict each district's partisan
leanings. Id. The court also discussed a method of analysis which uses prior legislative returns. Id. at
656. Under this method, the prior legislative returns are disaggregated and applied to the new districts
to predict the result. Id. at 656-57. Either method seems consistent with my approach, and the courts
should adopt whichever one seems to be more accurate. Cf. Bernard Grofman, Toward a Coherent
Theory of Gerrymandering:Bandemer and Thornburg, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING, supra note 8,
at 29, 45 (stating that the methods "are useful complements to one another").
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reached. Unless the prior redistricting plan of the forum state353 was bipartisan, the courts should compare the plan at issue with a bipartisan plan
in an otherwise similar state. An otherwise similar state must resemble the
forum state at least two ways. First, the similar state must have a partisan
balance comparable to that of the forum state, because a closely balanced
state will usually have a smaller seats/votes gap31 4 than an overwhelmingly Democratic or Republican state. 55 Second, the similar state must
have a legislative chamber or congressional delegation which is about the
same size as the forum state, because a small delegation will usually have
a larger balloon effect than a large delegation. For example, if Nebraska
has only three U.S. Representatives and an evenly balanced electorate it
will always have at least a 17% seats/votes gap, since its delegation will
be at least 67% Democratic or Republican. By contrast, if California has
forty-five U.S. Representatives and an evenly balanced electorate, the state
can come far closer to proportionality than Nebraska.356
Once the court has made findings about the forum state's actual and
projected election results and past election results357 in a similar state
with a bipartisan or nonpartisan plan, it should compare the seats/votes
gap for each state. If the seats/votes gap is substantially greater for the
forum state, its redistricting plan should be held prima facie unconstitutional. A substantial gap is one which would give the gerrymandering
party at least one congressional or legislative seat per election, because
any ruling which barred smaller discrepancies might force the forum state
to actually come closer to proportionality than an analogous state with a
bipartisan plan, or even reduce the majority party's seat share below a
proportional share. Of course, the state should be permitted to rebut the
prima facie case of unconstitutionality by showing that "the districting
' For example, a plan which led to
plan met legitimate state interests."358

353. A forum state is the state whose plan is being challenged, and whose district court will decide the suit.
354. A seat/votes gap is the difference between "the percentage of the statewide vote cast for a
party's legislative candidates [and] the percentage of seats in the legislature won by those candidates."
Alfange, supra note 79, at 221.
355. For example, in the 1982 congressional election, 14 states with two or more U.S. Representatives had a larger balloon effect than California, even though California enacted the notorious gerrymander upheld in Badham. In all but two of the 14 states, the majority party's share of the vote was
larger than the California Democrats' 51.8% share. See 1988 ABSTRACT, supra note 299, at 236. 243.
356. See Backstrom et al., supra note 344. at 169 n.16 (stating that any standard based on
disproportionality "becomes lumpy in a three seat state having only 100%. 67%, 33% and 0% of the
seats to aim for").
357. All states undergo redistricting at the same time. Thus, it would be difficult to project future
election results under another state's plan, because the courts would not know what other states' redistricting plans looked like at the time of a lawsuit.
358. See Bandemer. 478 U.S. at 141 (plurality opinion) (suggesting that if discriminatory intent
and effect are proven, then the gerrymander should be "examined for valid underpinnings").
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grossly disproportionate results might be justified on the ground that it
created many highly competitive districts, and that as a result a party with
51% of the statewide vote would always receive an inordinately high
percentage of the seats.
b. In Practice
To demonstrate how the bipartisan compromise
practice, I have chosen to analyze past election
districting plans which have been upheld by district
1982 congressional plan359 and North Carolina's
plan.3 "

test would work in
results under two
courts: California's
1992 congressional

(1) California
Under the plan upheld in Badham, California Democrats won 60%
(135 of 225) of all congressional elections36I between 1982 and 1990 but
only 52.2% of the two-party vote.362 Although no state is as large as California, New York had a bipartisan redistricting plan363 during the 1980s,
had more legislators than any state besides California, and had a roughly
similar partisan balance.364 Thus, New York is somewhat analogous to
California for redistricting purposes. Under the New York plan, the Democrats won 101 of 170 elections, or 59.4% of the elections, and 54.7% of
the two-party vote.365 Thus, the New York Democrats benefitted from a

359. Badham v. March Fong Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1988), affid mem., 488 U.S. 1024
(1989).
360. Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C.), affd men., 113 S. Ct. 30 (1992).
361. 1988 ABSTRACT, supra note 299, at 243; 1992 ABSTRACT, supra note 299, at 263 (percentages calculated by author).
362. 1988 ABSTRACT, supra note 299, at 236; 1992 ABSTRACT, supranote 299, at 257 (percentage
calculated by author). For the purposes of this article, I am defining a party's vote as the number of
votes received by the party's congressional candidates. I note, however, that some commentators prefer
averaging the parties' percentages in favor to avoid "overweighing" high-turnout districts. See, e.g.
Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 5, at 50-52 (asserting that measuring a mean district vote percentage for each party is more consistent with the actual basis of districting). But see Backstrom et al.,
supra note 344, at 163-64 (recognizing use of mean district vote percentage method, but noting that
arguably, "districts should lose or gairi potential impact in partisanship by their actual turnout"). As
long as the method is used to count "vote shares" is the same in both the forum state and in a similar
state, I doubt that this issue would alter the outcome of many cases. I also note that, for reasons of
convenience, my "vote shares" include votes received by unopposed candidates. However, omitting
votes cast for unopposed candidates is perfectly acceptable under my approach.
363. Richard Morrill, A Geographer'sPerspective, it POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING, supranote 8,
at 212, 221 (noting that in a table describing congressional redistricting plans, the New York plan is
listed as bipartisan); see also CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS IN THE
1980s 361 (Martha V. Gottron ed., 1983) [hereinafter Gottron].
364. 1992 ABSTRACT, supra note 299, at 276.
365. 1988 ABSTRACT, supra note 299, at 243; 1992 ABSTRACT, supra note 299, at 263 (per-
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4.7% seats/votes gap, while California Democrats benefitted from a 7.8%
seats/votes gap.3" Moreover, in the absence of gerrymandering, New
York should have had a larger seats/votes gap than California, since it was
slightly more Democratic and slightly smaller than California.367 Thus,
California Democrats won at least 3% more seats, or about one and onehalf more legislators per year than a bipartisan plan would have produced.
As the gerrymander gave Democrats at least one extra victory per year,
the courts should have rejected the California plan upheld in Badham.
However, a slightly less egregious plan, one with about a 5% seats/votes
gap favoring the Democrats, would have been upheld under my test.
(2) North Carolina
Under the plan upheld in Pope, the North Carolina Democrats won
eight of twelve congressional seats, or 66.7%, even though they got only
51.6% of the statewide congressional vote. 368 Thus, Democrats benefitted
from a 15.1% "seats/votes gap".369
Although Massachusetts, Georgia, and New Jersey are all about the
same size as North Carolina, New Jersey is most analogous to North Carolina because, unlike Massachusetts, it is closely balanced between the
parties and, unlike Georgia, its redistricting process was bipartisan in
1990-91."' 0 In the first congressional election held under New Jersey's
redistricting plan, the Democrats won 47.3% of the votes and 53.8% of
the seats.37' Thus, it seems that in North Carolina a bipartisan plan might
have created a 6.5% seats/votes gap in favor of the Democrats, while the
plan actually enacted created a 15.7% seats/votes gap in favor of the Democrats.372 It follows that the North Carolina Democrats' skill at gerrymandering gave the Democrats an extra 9.2% of congressional seats, or
about one extra representative, and that if the 1992 election results were

centages calculated by author).
366. Id.
367. See supra notes 354-56 and accompanying text (noting that the seats/votes gaps are usually
larger when one party dominates and when legislative delegations are smaller).
368. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 110 (Mark S. Hoffman ed., 1993) [hereinafter
WORLD ALMANAC] (percentages calculated by author).
369. Id.
370. See Charles Mahtesian & Ines P. Alicea, Redone District Lines Nudge Dwyer. Pursell from
House, 50 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 825 (1992) (noting that the redistricting plan was drawn up by a
bipartisan commission).
371. WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 368. at 109 (percentages calculated by author). Under a strictly proportional scheme, the Republicans rather than the Democrats would have won by a 7-6 margin.
However, the Republican popular vote edge was partially caused by the Republican advantage in high
turnout districts, which, of course, was not reflected in the number of seats won. For example. the
Democrats won all three districts in which under 200,000 votes were cast. Id.
372. Id. at 110.
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typical,373 the courts should have rejected the districting plan upheld in
Pope.
In sum, under my bipartisan compromise test both Badham and Pope
were wrongly decided.374
3. Possible Disadvantages of a "Bipartisan Compromise Test"
As noted above, any standard for deciding gerrymandering cases must
be consistent with Bandemer and workable. Each of these issues will be

addressed in turn.
a. Consistency with Bandemer
The Bandemer plurality held that an especially egregious gerrymander
would be unconstitutional, but also found that a majority party is entitled
to some sort of balloon effect.375 Thus, the Bandemer plurality's consistent degradation test requires gerrymandering plaintiffs to show, at a
minimum, that a partisan gerrymander is "(1) intentional, (2) severe, and

(3) predictably nontransient in its effects."376 Common sense suggests
that if a redistricting plan gives the majority party a "victory bonus" sub-

stantially larger than that created by a bipartisan redistricting plan, the
plan's consequences are severe and, unless the victory bonus is a fluke
caused by some unusually narrow victories or a statewide partisan landslide, "predictably nontransient" as well. Thus, it would seem that my
bipartisan gerrymandering test is consistent with Bandemer.
In response, it could be argued that (1) Bandemer allows claims only
by "pariah groups" who have been completely excluded from
policymaking, as opposed to "Democrats and Republicans under normal
'
conditions,"377
and (2) Bandemer expressly states that the Constitution

373. It appears likely that the 1992 results were typical, for two reasons. First, there was no evidence of an overwhelming partisan tide, since North Carolina elected a Republican senator and a Democratic governor. See WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 368, at 105, 113. Second, no congressman won
with under 53% of the vote. Id. at 110 (percentages calculated by author). Thus, the Democrats could
not argue that their 8-4 majority was a fluke caused by one narrow election or a statewide Democratic
landslide.
374. The above analysis also applies to cases involving state legislative elections. I have chosen
congressional elections as examples only because statewide congressional vote totals for the parties are
somewhat easier to find and calculate. Statewide congressional vote totals are calculated in the annual
Statistical Abstract, while state legislative vote totals are listed district-by-district in scattered state records.
375. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 130 (plurality opinion) (if most districts were competitive, "even
a narrow statewide preference for either party would produce an overwhelming majority for the winning party... we cannot hold that such a reapportionment law would violate the Equal Protection
Clause").
376. Grofman, supra note 352, at 30.
377. See Lowenstein, supra note 161, at 83.
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does not require bipartisan redistricting. Each of these arguments will be
addressed in turn.
(1) Does Bandener preclude claims by major parties?
The Badham and Pope courts suggested that a political group cannot
raise a gerrymandering claim unless it is wholly "shut out of the political
'
process."378
For example, the Badham court denied relief to California
Republicans because, inter alia, the Republicans had elected a governor
and a U.S. Senator,379 and Pope denied relief to North Carolina Republicans because, inter alia, plaintiffs did not allege that "Republicans in the
Democratic majority districts are precluded from influencing the actions of
their Congressmen.""38 Similarly, Daniel Lowenstein argues that
Bandemer prohibits gerrymandering only when a gerrymander victimizes a
"pariah group" such as "Blacks, communists, and homosexuals"38 ' or a
gerrymander allows the minority party to become a "permanent
majority. 1)382
In support of this theory, Lowenstein argues that (1)Bandemer bars
most gerrymandering suits because party affiliation is not a "suspect classification" and (2) Badham and Pope correctly hold that gerrymandering is
actionable only where plaintiffs lack influence in "the political process as
'
a whole."383
For the reasons stated below, both arguments are without
merit.
(a) Bandemer and suspect classifications
As noted above, the Bandemer plurality opinion requires plaintiffs in
gerrymandering cases to prove both discriminatory intent and discriminatory effect.384 Lowenstein reasons that because these standards "have
grown up around the concept of 'suspect classifications,' "385 a suit under Banderner is actionable only if the plaintiffs belong to a group which
is protected by the "suspect classification" doctrine-that is, "groups that
are already victimized by pervasive discrimination ...[such as] political
groups that have suffered from discrimination to the degree that their

378. Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 397 (W.D.N.C.), affid nrem., 113 S.Ct. 30 (1992); Badham,
694 F. Supp. at 670.
379. Badham, 694 F. Supp. at 672. But see Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin. 980 F.2d 943.
957-58 (4th Cir. 1992).
380. Pope, 809 F. Supp. at 397.
381. Lowenstein, supra note 161, at 83.
382. Id. at 87-89. Lowenstein admits that this example does not seem very plausible. Id. at 89.
383. Id. at 83 (quoting Bandemer. 478 U.S. at 133 (plurality opinion)).
384. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 127 (plurality opinion).
385. Lowenstein. supra note 161. at 81.
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status under the Equal Protection Clause is analogous to the status of racial minorities. '38 6
Lowenstein's suspect classification interpretation of Bandemer is incorrect for two reasons. First, if the Bandemer plurality had intended to'
bar claims by major political parties it probably would have done so directly, because such a rule would have rendered most of its analysis unnecessary. Instead of discussing political gerrymandering in detail, the
plurality could have stated that a redistricting plan is unconstitutional only
when it discriminates against voters belonging to a pariah group or highly
unusual circumstances require the Court to intervene in the political process. As Bandemer was a relatively ordinary case of gerrymandering, the
Court would not have had to specify what such "unusual circumstances"
were. Second, even Lowenstein admits that "just as the Court blazed new
doctrinal trails when confronted with Baker and Reynolds, the Court
should and would, if confronted with [a sufficiently egregious situation] ... find a way to restore 'democratic order.' "" It may be that if
the plurality had explained its reasoning more fully, Bandemer might have
blazed a new doctrinal trail. For example, the Court could have believed
that political partisanship is itself a suspect classification because discrimination based on partisanship is pervasive even if the victims are not permanently powerless in every state.38 The Court might have also believed
gerrymandering should be dealt with under the rational basis test. Under
this test, legislation may be upheld if it rationally singles out a class of
people in order to achieve a "legitimate public purpose."389 It could be
argued that the purpose of gerrymandering, favoring one group of voters
over another, is illegitimate, and that gerrymandering is therefore irrational
and unconstitutional. 3" Finally, the Court may have believed the right to
"fair and effective" representation was a fundamental right which was
infringed by gerrymandering.39'

386. Id. at 80-81.
387. Id. at 87.
388. See supra notes 260-66 and accompanying text (suggesting that political affiliation may be a
"suspect classification" even where major political parties victimized).
389. TRIBE, supra note 36, § 16-2, at 1440. Indeed, Justices Powell and Stevens appear to have
endorsed this view. Cf. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 166 (Powell. I., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (stating that a gerrymander violates the state's duty to govern impartially).
390. See supra notes 233-37 and accompanying text (noting that "rationality review" is less deferential in recent decades, especially when noneconomic issues are involved).
391. See supra notes 223-92 and accompanying text (describing possible doctrinal bases of
Bandemer in more detail and suggesting that the Court meant to apply some form of rationality review).
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(b) Bandemer and exclusionfrom the politicalprocess
A more plausible argument is that Bandemer excludes most claims by
major political parties, because the plurality stated that:
1. Unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when "the electoral
system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade [a group's]
'
influence on the politicalprocess as a whole"392
2. Supporters of a losing candidate are "usually deemed to be adequately represented by the winning candidate and to have as much oppor' and
tunity to influence that candidate as other voters in the district"393
3. Racial gerrymandering is unconstitutional only where "disproportionate results appeared in conjunction with strong indicia of lack of political power and the denial offair representation ... (unconstitutional political gerrymandering] may be found only where a history (actual or projected) of4 disproportionate results appears in conjunction with similar
'39

indicia."

Although the "exclusion from the political process" interpretation of
Bandemer is not irrational, it is probably not correct, for two reasons.
First, if the plurality had intended to virtually prohibit gerrymandering
claims by major parties, it could have done so by saying: "This case is
about Democrats; Democrats are a major party in a two-party state; major
parties are never discriminated against in the same way that racial minorities are; therefore, even though gerrymandering is justiciable, the Democratic claim must be rejected. Q.E.D."395 Instead, the plurality meandered
through the evidentiary record, creating the vague consistent degradation
standard and pointing out, inter alia, that (1) "[r]elying on a single election to prove unconstitutional discrimination is unsatisfactory"3 " and (2)
the district court failed to: (a) find that "the 1982 election results were the
predictable consequences of the 1981 Act ... [or] hold that those results
were a reliable prediction of future ones"'3 97 (b) "ask by what percentage
the statewide Democratic vote would have had to increase to control either
the House or the Senate"'398 or (c) find that "the 1981 reapportionment
would consign the Democrats to a minority status in the assembly
throughout the 1980's [or thereafter]." ' Second, if the Bandemer plurality had believed that its creation of a gerrymandering cause of action

392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

Bandemer. 478 U.S. at 132 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
Id. (plurality opinion).
Id. at 139-40 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
Grofman. supra note 352, at 48 (criticizing the theory).
Bandemer. 478 U.S. at 135 (plurality opinion).
Id. (plurality opinion).
Id. (plurality opinion).
i. (plurality opinion).
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merely provided "a potential basis for protecting outcast political
groups,"4" the plurality would have bothered to explain, as the Badham
court in fact did,4"' why the plaintiffs were not an "outcast political
group."
Admittedly, the plurality noted that minority party voters are "usually
deemed to be adequately represented by the winning candidate and to have
as much opportunity to influence that candidate as other voters in the district 4 2 and that "Indiana is a swing State." 3 However, neither observation was part of an explanation why Indiana Democrats were not an outcast political group. The plurality's observation that supporters of a losing
party can influence winning candidates was used to justify its holding that
"a failure of proportional representation alone does not constitute impermissible discrimination,"' while its statement that "Indiana is a swing
State" was followed by its exhaustive discussion of the evidentiary gaps in
the record,"5 and its conclusion that "[w]ithout findings of this nature
[i.e., that the 1981 redistricting act would consistently hurt the Democrats],
the District Court erred in concluding that the 1981 Act violated the Equal
Protection Clause."' Therefore, the plurality did not state that the Indiana Democrats could not obtain relief merely because they were not an
outcast political group.
In sum, the Bandemer plurality opinion is simply too vague and incomplete to have held that gerrymandering plaintiffs must belong to a
"pariah" or "outcast" group. The "political pariah" interpretation of
Bandemer is
"too clever by half'-[because the supporters of this theory are]
interpreting a set of judicial opinions which are less logical, less
coherent, and less readable than [their] exegesis of them. It mayturn out the Justices of the Supreme Court simply have not
thought through the whole problem of gerrymandering and might
not agree with [such an] analysis of what they meant."

400. See Lowenstein, supra note 161, at 102. Admittedly, the plurality could have shown without
much difficulty that the Indiana Democrats were not "outcasts," by quoting Justice O'Connor's discussion of this point. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 152 (O'Connor, J.,concurring) (comparing political
parties and racial minorities).
401. Badham, 694 F. Supp. at 672-73.
402. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132 (plurality opinion).
403. Id. at 135 (plurality opinion).
404. M. at 132 (plurality opinion).
405. Id. at 135 (plurality opinion).
406. Id. at 136 (plurality opinion).
407. Still. supra note 340, at 1028.
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(2) Does Bandemer bar judicial consideration of bipartisan redistricting?
The Bandemer plurality noted that in Gaffney,4 5 the Court upheld a
redistricting plan which created "as many safe seats for each party as the
demographic and predicted political characteristics of the State would
permit ... [and thereby left] the minority in each safe district without a

representative of its choice. ' '4 9 The plurality did not question Gaffney,
but added that "Gaffney in no way suggested that the Constitution requires
the approach that Connecticut had adopted in that case.

'410

It could be

argued that the Bandemer plurality's discussion of Gaffney precludes lower courts from requiring states to adopt a plan similar to a bipartisan redistricting plan. This argument lacks merit, because state legislators may
adopt a bipartisan compromise or a plan yielding similar results without
creating "as many safe seats for each party as [possible]."" ' For example, in an evenly balanced state with a bipartisan redistricting plan, the
number of safe districts for each party could range from zero for each
party to 50% of the districts for each party. In fact, one survey of 1980s
redistricting showed that bipartisan redistricting plans created just as many
competitive seats as "strongly partisan" plans.4 '2 Thus, a bipartisan compromise test does not require the sort of bipartisan gerrymander upheld in
Gaffney.
b. Workability
If, as I believe, Bandemer does little to limit lower courts' discretion,
lower courts must choose a workable test from among numerous possibilities. I define a "workable" test as one which is relatively easy to apply,
even for district judges who lack mathematical expertise, and otherwise
makes sense.
On the surface, the bipartisan compromise test seems easy to apply. If
a plan is challenged, the court need only resolve minor technical issues,413 find a state with a bipartisan or nonpartisan plan which is other-

408. Gaffiley, 412 U.S. at 752-54.
409. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 130-31 (plurality opinion).
410. Id. at 131 (plurality opinion).
411. Id. (plurality opinion).
412. Morrill, supra note 363, at 223 (noting that in states operating under "strong partisan" plans,
22% of congressional seats were competitive between 1982 and 1986, while in states with "bipartisan"
plans, 23% were competitive). I note, however, that states with court-drawn plans or plans created by
nonpartisan commissions had more vigorous competition than both groups. Id. Morrill defines "competitive" seats as seats won with under 60% of the vote. Id. at 220.
413. Minor technical issues which would have to be resolved include whether to define a party's
"vote share" as its average district percentage or its percent of its total vote. and whether to count
unopposed candidates in a party's seat and vote shares. These issues should rarely be outcome-determinative because they will affect the parties' vote shares in both the forum state and the allegedly
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wise similar to the forum state, and compare the actual or likely results of
the partisan and nonpartisan plans.
Moreover, the bipartisan compromise test will deter litigation for three
reasons. First, gerrymandering litigation will be automatically foreclosed in
most states where districts are redrawn by a bipartisan commission or by a
state government divided between the parties. Second, if the bipartisan
compromise test is adopted, the dominant party will try to limit its gains
from redistricting in order to avoid litigation. Third, if a bipartisan compromise test is adopted, the minority party will know that the Constitution
does not require proportional representation, and will be deterred from
challenging redistricting plans which are likely to yield nearly proportional
results.
Nevertheless, the bipartisan compromise plan suffers from the same
alleged disadvantages as any method based on the seats/votes gap. Numerous commentators have criticized tests based on the seats/votes gap on
the grounds that: (1) it is impossible for the courts to project future election results while applying seats/votes tests, (2) the concept of a statewide
"party total" is flawed because legislative elections are decided based on
the quality of the individual candidates, (3) an unusually large seats/votes
gap may be caused by the geographic distribution of the parties' statewide
strength rather than by gerrymandering, (4) judicial reliance on the
seats/votes gap would encourage parties to run sluggish campaigns in
order to avoid gerrymandering suits, and (5) parties will engage in bipartisan "incumbent protection" gerrymandering in order to avoid litigation." 4 Each of these objections will be dealt with below.
(1) The problem of future results
One commentator argues that seats/votes tests "wait until an election
has been held under the new plan, note the percentage of legislators elect-

comparable state.
414. Other objections to seats/votes tests have been implicitly dealt with above. For example,
some commentators point out that seats/votes tests fail to take into account uncontested races, or disparities in voter turnout between districts. See Alfange, supra note 79. at 223; Lowenstein &
Steinberg, supra note 5, at 49-53. However, neither bias is intrinsic to a votes/seats analysis, because
courts could adjust vote totals by excluding uncontested elections or using a party's average district
percentage of the vote as its vote percentage instead of its statewide total. Of course, one advantage of
comparing a state's seats/votes gap to that of another state (instead of comparing it to an ideal of
proportionality) is that such issues fade in importance, because many states have partisan disparities
between high- and low-turnout districts or the occasional uncontested election. It has also been argued
that a seats/votes test "ensures litigation in every state after every redistricting, which would be a
certainty since the losing party after each election would claim they lost because of the way the districts were drawn." Backstrom et al.. supra note 344, at 156. However, the "bipartisan compromise"
test, unlike seats/votes tests which are not tied to the existence of partisanship in the redistricting process, actually deters litigation by immunizing bipartisan plans from lawsuits.
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ed from one party, and then compare this with the percentage of aggregate
votes for all legislators of that party. 4 5 If true, this argument might render any seats/votes test impractical for two reasons. First, the Bandemer
plurality explicitly prohibited lower courts from relying solely on the
results of one election to establish unconstitutional gerrymandering.4 t6
Thus, plaintiffs cannot overturn a redistricting plan based solely on the
results of the first election under the plan. Second, it has been argued that
if no measure of partisan gerrymandering is available before the next
election of legislators "[district drawers] have no way, even with the best
of intentions, to tell whether they have drawn a permissible plan."4" 7
In fact, a seats/votes test can consider future as well as past election
results. For example, in Hastert v. State Board of Elections,418 a district
court projected election results based on assumptions about the parties'
vote shares. In Hastert, Illinois' failure to adopt a 1992-2000 congressional redistricting plan forced the court to choose between Democratic and
Republican redistricting plans. The court found that both plans were constitutional, 4 9 but adopted the Republican plan because, inter alia, it was
more "likely to produce a fair distribution of congressional seats across
party lines. '4 2' Both parties addressed the "political fairness" issue by
submitting expert testimony which projected likely election results under
the two plans. The Republicans' expert projected likely election results by
disaggregating 1982-90 congressional vote tallies and applying them to
congressional districts proposed in the two plans.4 2 ' Thus, the
Republicans' expert implicitly assumed the Republican share of the statewide congressional vote would be the same as it was between 1982 and
1990, approximately 45.8%.422 Based on this assumption, the
Republicans' expert projected that Republicans would win 7-9 of 20 congressional seats, or 35-45% of the seats, under the Republican plan and 68 seats, or 30-40% of the seats, under the Democratic plan. 423 Thus, the
Republican expert's testimony should have been interpreted as a finding

415. Backstrom et al., supra note 342, at 305-06.
416. Bandenzer, 478 U.S. at 135 (plurality opinion).
417. Backstrom et al., supra note 342, at 156.
418. 777 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. I11.
1991).
419. Id. at 662.
420. Id. The court also found that the Republican plan "achieves precise mathematical equality of
population across congressional districts" and was "superior ...with respect to fairness to the voting
rights of racial and language minorities." Id.
421. Id. at 656-57.
422. 1988 ABSTRACT, supra note 299, at 236: 1992 ABSTRACT, supra note 299, at 257 (percentages calculated by author). In fact, the court explicitly stated that according to the Republicans'
expert, the "Democrats enjoyed slightly greater support." Hastert, 777 F. Supp. at 656 n.35.
423. Hastert, 777 F. Supp. at 656-57. All experts assumed that one or two seats would be "tossups" which would probably go back and forth between the parties. Id.
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that the seats/votes gap favoring the Democrats would be about 1-11% under the Republican plan and 6-16% under the Democratic plan.424
By contrast, the Democrats' expert "disaggregated election data from
elections for statewide offices down to the precinct level, weighted them
and reapplied them to the [proposed] new district[s]." 4" Based on this
data, the Democrats' expert assumed that the state was evenly split between the parties,4 26 and concluded that the Democratic plan would yield
9-11 Democratic seats, while the Republican plan would yield 9-10 Democratic seats.427 Thus, the Democrats' expert evidently believed that neither plan would deviate by more than 5% from proportional representation, because the Democrats would get 50% of the vote and 45-55% of the
congressional seats under either plan. The court adopted a modified version of the Democratic expert's method but held that under this method
the Republican plan's results were fairer.428
However, the ultimate decision of the Hastert court is less important
than the court's reliance on expert projections of the parties' seat shares
and vote shares. Hastert shows that even if no election has been held
under a districting plan, expert testimony can give a court some clue as to
the likely seats/votes gap caused by a districting plan.429
Moreover, the results of the 1992 election show the experts correctly
estimated tie seats/votes gap. In 1992, the first House election was held
under the Republican plan, the Republicans captured 44.4% of the statewide vote and 40% of the seats. 4 Thus, the seats/votes gap was 4.4%
result which was perfectly consistent with the Republicans' expert's apparent belief that the Democratic "seats/votes advantage" under the Republi-

424. The gap is calculated as the difference between the projected win percentage and the assumed
share of the vote, e.g., 45.8% minus a projected range of 35-45% yields a gap of 1-I1 percentage
points.
425. Id. at 657.
426. Id. at 656 n.35.
427. Id. at 657.
428. The court altered the expert's methodology by using one obscure statewide election as a
means of determining the district-by-district balance (instead of weighing various elections). Id. at 658.
The use of statewide elections to determine a state's party balance is known as the "base line race"
method, since it uses statewide races to determine a party's long-term base. Id.; see infra notes 567-88
and accompanying text (criticizing base line race method). Based on that election, the court concluded
that the state was evenly balanced and that the Republican plan would reflect this fact more accurately
than would the Democratic plan. Hastert, 777 F. Supp. at 658-59.
429. Once the future "seats/votes" gap under a redistricting plan is established, it should not be
difficult to ascertain the seats/votes gap for an otherwise comparable state with a bipartisan plan. All
the court needs to do is (1) find a state with (a) a bipartisan redistricting plan in the prior decade. (b) a
partisan balance similar to the forum state, and (c) a congressional delegation or legislative chamber of
similar size and (2) calculate the seats/votes gap in the comparable bipartisan state over the past decade.
430. WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 368, at 107-08 (percentages calculated by author).
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can plan would be 1-11% of the seats, and less than one full seat away
from the Democratic expert's estimate that the Republican plan would lead
"'
to proportional representation or a slight Republican advantage.43
The 1992 election results also suggest that the Hastert court erred in
using the results of statewide results to project congressional district results, since the Republican expert's findings, based on past congressional
election results, that the Democrats were the majority party was more
accurate in 1992 than the court's assumption, based on statewide election
results, that the state was evenly balanced between the parties.
However, the correct method for determining a district's likely partisan balance will undoubtedly emerge over time through trial and error.
Some courts will, as I suggest, rely on prior returns for the office being
redistricted, whether it be Congress or state legislature, while others will
follow Hastert and rely on statewide returns. Either method will allow
courts to project seats/votes gaps, since each will allow courts to project
district-by-district vote shares.
Admittedly, using expert testimony may lead courts into a morass of
conflicting statistics, and make a seats/votes test more complicated than a
court would like. However, the experts are unlikely to disagree dramatically, because the likely results of a redistricting plan will often be public
43 2
knowledge and will be publicly discussed by politicians and the press.
In fact, the Bandemer plurality noted that "whenever a legislature redistricts, those responsible for the legislation will know the likely political
composition of the new districts and will have a prediction as to whether a
particular district is a safe one ... [for either party] or is a competitive
'
district that either candidate might win."433

(2) The problem of candidate personalities
One popular argument against seats/votes tests is that the use of
seats/votes gaps to measure political fairness

431. Id.
432. See, e.g., CONG. Q. WKLY. SPEC. REP.. supra note 351. Indeed, politicians privately use
projected election results in creating new districts. See Samuel Kernell & Bernard Grofman. Detennining the Predictability of Partisan Voting Patterns in California Elections, 1978-1984, in POLITICAL
GERRYMANDERING, supra note 8,at 289, 290.
When political consultants advise legislators on redistricting they customarily provide legislators with evaluations of the political and demographic characteristics of the new districts
as compared to the old ....Such information would not be provided if the previous electoral history of the geography that goes to make up the new districts were not thought to be
informative about its probable future voting behavior.
Id.
433. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 128 (plurality opinion).
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is grounded in an assumption which need have no basis in reality-that a person who votes for a candidate of one party in one
district would vote for the candidate of the same party in another
district and would want that party to be in the majority in the
legislature. Individual legislative elections are often intensely personal matters, turning not in the slightest degree on which party
the voter wants to control the legislature, but on local issues or on
the voters' perceptions as to the individual merits of the opposing
candidates. It just cannot be assumed that a vote for a particular
candidate in a particular district is a vote for that candidate's party
statewide.4"
In fact, there is usually a strong correlation between a district's partisan alignment in one election and its alignment in other elections.435
Moreover, the argument that every election is unique ignores the fact that
whatever unusual circumstances affect vote totals will also affect seat
totals. For example, if the Democrats have an unusual number of popular
incumbents, both their statewide vote total and their share of legislative
seats will increase. Thus, the popularity of a party's candidates will rarely
affect the gap between its proportion of votes and its proportion of seats.
Of course, it is possible that in a given year, the seats/votes gap will
be unusually large because one party wins a large number of close elections, perhaps because of a statewide partisan landslide or the quality of its
candidates. Under a bipartisan compromise test, the forum state's
seats/votes gap will be calculated using projected as well as actual results.436 Thus, the results of one election will rarely be dispositive.437
Even if plaintiffs rely heavily on one election, defendants could be allowed to rebut a prima facie case of unconstitutional gerrymandering
through a "fluke defense."438 Under this defense, a defendant could de-

434. Alfange, supra note 79, at 223-24; see also Hastert, 777 F. Supp. at 658 (questioning the
utility of statewide legislative seats/votes gap because statewide legislative vote totals mix "races including different candidates and issues ... and fails to account for the power of incumbency") (citation omitted); Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 5, at 59-60 ("There is no statewide vote in this
country for the House of Representatives or the state legislature. Rather, there are separate elections
between separate candidates in separate districts .... [V]oters do not vote for the House of Representatives or the state legislature, but for particular candidates"); Backstrom et al.. supra note 342, at 306
n.l10 (statewide legislative party totals not useful because in a given year "there may be different
candidates, different campaigns, different issues, and different voters .... The search for a partisan
index should not also have to overcome the burden of non-party components of the vote for specific
legislative candidates.').
435. See, e.g., Kernell & Grofman, supra note 432. at 294 (noting that in congressional elections,
the correlation between the 1980 and the 1982 Republican vote was .77).
436. See supra text accompanying notes 351-52, 418-33.
437. See supra part IlI.B.2.(a).
438. See supra note 373 and accompanying text (emphasizing that North Carolina's 1992 congres-
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feat a claim of unconstitutional gerrymandering by showing that the
plaintiffs' gerrymandering claim is based primarily on an unusually large
seats/votes gap in one election, and that the seats/votes gap occurred-because defendant benefitted from an unusual number of elections which
were so close that they could not be the result of a gerrymander,439 as
district drawers who are creating a gerrymander will want to create as
many "safe" seats for their party as possible. Even if plaintiffs rely partially on one postgerrymander election, such fluke defenses are likely to be
rare, because strongly partisan plans yield fewer competitive seats than
other redistricting plans." For example, a survey of 1980s congressional
redistricting plans divided congressional redistricting plans into six categories (strong partisan, weak partisan, bipartisan, court, court-drawn but
partisan, and commission) and concluded that the "strong partisan" plans
yielded the smallest number of competitive seats between 1982 and 1986,
because only 22% of all elections held under such plans were won with
under 60% of the vote. 4 '
(3) The problem of "natural partisan boundaries"
Even if there is a long-term seats/votes gap in a state, it could be
argued that such a gap "may in fact be the result of natural advantage-the inordinate concentration of partisans in one place-rather than
any deliberate partisan districting scheme."' 4 This argument has numerous flaws. First, it is unclear when, if ever, it would not be applicable. For
example, one commentator argues that:
If the parties' supporters are perfectly evenly distributed across the
state so that the minority party will be a sizeable minority everywhere but a majority nowhere, all of its legislative votes will be
naturally wasted, and, without any gerrymandering at all, it will
win no legislative seats. On the other hand, if a party's strength is
concentrated in particular geographic areas so that it will normally

sional redistricting was arguably unconstitutional because the 1992 results were not caused by unusual
factors which would not recur in future elections).
439. See supra note 373 and accompanying text.
440. Morrill. supra note 363, at 223.
441. Morrill, supra note 363, at 220, 223. Figures for the other categories were as follows: Courtdrawn partisan-23%; bipartisan-23%: weak partisan-27%, court-33%. commission-41 %. Id. For
example. the plans upheld in Badharn and Pope yielded no extremely close elections (Le.. elections
won with under 51% of the two-party vote) in the first post-redistricting election. See AMERICA VOTES
15, at 70-71 (Richard M. Scammon & Alice V. McGillivray eds., 1983); WORLD ALMANAC. supra
note 368, at 110 (percentages calculated by author).
442. Grofman, supra note 21, at 120 (quoting Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1501 (S.D.
Ind. 1984) (Pell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), rev'd, 478 U.S. 109 (1986)).
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win by very large majorities in those areas, it can expect to win a
substantially smaller percentage of seats in the legislature than its
proportional share of the statewide legislative vote because so
many of its votes will be wasted as in excess of its needs. However unfair these results may be, they are not brought about by "gerrymandering except in the sense that 'all districting is gerrymandering.' 9)443
In other words, the minority party is underrepresented both when its
support is dispersed, and when its support is not dispersed. The natural
partisan boundaries theory begs one question: Is there ever a situation
where the minority party is not underrepresented? If not, seats/votes gaps
should be equal in all (similarly sized and equally competitive) states in
the absence of gerrymandering.
The natural partisan boundary theory has also been used to explain
why, in the absence of deliberate gerrymandering, Democrats are always
underrepresented in highly urbanized Northern states (where their support
is concentrated in large cities)." Table 1 shows the 1982-90 seats/votes
gap for non-Southern states with over fifteen legislators." 5 Based on Table 1, it appears that the Democrats were not significantly
underrepresented in any major Northern state, even in the one state with a
Republican-drawn plan (Pennsylvania).

TABLE 1

New York
Pennsylvania
Ohio
Illinois
Michigan
California

Democratic
Vote Share

Democratic
Seat Share

54.6
51.9
51.5
54.2
55.9
52.2

59.4
53.1
51.4
61.0
62.2
60.0

Democratic
Advantage
+ 4.8
+ 1.2
-0.1
+ 6.8
+ 6.3
+ 7.8

Type of
Redistricting
Bipartisan
Strong partisan (R)
Bipartisan
Court-drawn Partisan (D)
Court-drawn Partisan (D)
Strong partisan (D

443. Alfange, supra note 79, at 222.
444. For instance, one article raising the "partisan boundaries" issue uses Michigan as an example
of a "naturally Republican" state. See Backstrom et al., supra note 7, at 1127.
445. The "type of redistricting" is based on Richard Morrill's article dividing redistricting plans
into six categories (strong partisan, weak partisan, bipartisan, court, court partisan, commission). See
Morrill, supra note 363, at 222-23. The other statistics are from the Statistical Abstract. See 1988
ABSTRACT, supra note 299, at 236, 243; 1992 ABSTRACT, supra note 299, at 257, 263 (percentages
calculated by author).
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Even if a seats/votes gap is related to "natural advantages-[such as]
the inordinate concentration of partisans in one place," 6 it is still a valid indicator of gerrymandering for two reasons. First, Bandemer requires
"intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group [as well
as] an actual discriminatory effect." 7 Therefore, if the dominant party's
natural advantages, rather than any discriminatory intent, caused a seatvote gap, no gerrymandering claim would lie under Bandemer even if the
court used a seats/votes test of some kind to define "discriminatory effect.""' 8 Second, the notion of natural partisan advantages is itself muddled, because there is no obvious reason why one set of district boundaries
is natural and another is not. Indeed, the Gaffney court implicitly rejected
the idea of natural district boundaries when it stated that a neutral, "politically mindless" districting plan may
produce, whether intended or not, the most grossly gerrymandered
results; and, in any event, it is most unlikely that the political
impact of such a plan would remain undiscovered by the time it
was proposed or adopted, in which event the results would be both
known and, if not changed, intended. 9

(4) The problem of unintended consequences
One commentator has pointed out that:
A further flaw in using election result of legislative elections to
test for partisan gerrymandering is that this would neutralize the
effects of quality candidates and targeted campaign efforts in the
legislative contests. What would be the incentive for a party to
engage in careful candidate recruitment and vigorous campaigns if
their victory might
45 ° be countermanded because their efforts were
too successful?
This argument lacks merit because a party's successful campaign
effort will probably be reflected in both its vote totals and its seat totals.45' Similarly, if a party decided not to vigorously contest elections,

446. Backstrom et al.,
supra note 7,at 1127.
447. Bandemer. 478 U.S. at 127 (plurality opinion).
448. Id. at 131-32 (plurality opinion).
449. Gaffney. 412 U.S. at 753.
450. Backstrom et al..
supra note 342. at 156.
451. For example, if the Democrats nominated unusually appealing candidates. the Democrats
would get more votes and get more seats.
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both its vote share and its seat share would probably suffer.45 Admittedly, it is theoretically possible that a party could, by allocating its resources
to its closest races, increase its seat share without increasing its vote share.
However, it is unlikely that any conceivable antigerrymandering rule
would discourage such targeting, because no rational political party would
forego election victories now in order to avoid a lawsuit which might not
invalidate a redistricting plan for several years. While the litigation proceeded, the more vigorous party's candidates would be winning elections,
serving constituents, and benefiting from the advantages of incumbency.
Thus, it seems highly unlikely that the possibility of winning a lawsuit
tomorrow would discourage vigorous partisan competition today.
(5) The problem of incumbent protection
It could also be argued that by encouraging bipartisan districting plans,
a seats/votes test, especially my bipartisan compromise test, will encourage
legislators to adopt bipartisan "incumbent protection plans" in order to
avoid gerrymandering suits.453
Even if this argument is correct, it is entitled to little weight, for two
reasons. First, bipartisan districting plans are no more anticompetitive than
partisan ones.454 Thus, a shift from partisan to bipartisan plans makes the
partisan balance fairer, and would not appreciably diminish political competition. Second, bipartisan plans distort public policy less than partisan
plans, because bipartisan plans do not distort the party balance in the
legislature and therefore do not distort the ideological balance as much as
partisan plans. Admittedly, a seats/votes test would allow incumbents to
protect themselves to a greater extent than would some other
antigerrymandering tests. Nevertheless, I believe that the advantages of a
seats/votes test outweigh this disadvantage.455

452. This possibility supports the inclusion of unopposed elections in the parties' vote shares for
purposes of any seats/votes test. If the dominant party wins an election with no opposition (as opposed
to winning with 60% or 70% of the vote), its vote share would both increase and would move closer
to its seat share (assuming that its statewide seat share exceeded its statewide vote share). Consequently, the votes/seats gap would be reduced, and it would be harder for the minority party's gerrymandering claim to succeed. Thus, a seats/votes test may encourage the minority party to contest
seemingly hopeless elections.
453. Cf. Bruce Cain, Perspectives on Davis v. Bandemer Views of the Practitioner Theorist and
Reformer, in POLMCAL GERRYMANDERING, supra note 8, at 117, 128 (postulating that incumbents
could use Bandener"to justify anti-competitive or non-competitive bipartisan gerrymanders").
454. Morrill, supranote 363, at 223-26 (comparing competitiveness of strongly partisan and bipartisan plans).
455. Indeed, it has been argued that incumbency protection is not a "disadvantage" at all. because
incumbency protection ensures the election and retention of more experienced legislators and the existence of "safe districts" which allow both parties to be represented even after partisan landslides. See
Alfange, supra note 79, at 226-27. Whether these factors support a seats/votes test depends on one's
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C. Alternative Standards
The bipartisan compromise test, like any other proposed legal standard, should not be evaluated in isolation. Instead, it should be compared
to other tests for evaluating districting plans.
Tests for detecting or preventing gerrymandering can be divided into
two types. The first type, "process-oriented" or "formal" tests, seek to
deter gerrymandering by removing partisan considerations from the redistricting process. The second type, "result-oriented" tests, require courts to
consider the possible results of a redistricting plan." 6
1. Process-Oriented Tests
Possible process-oriented tests include (1) requiring courts to adopt
the most compact district possible and (2) evaluating redistricting plans
solely on the basis of discriminatory intent, without considering discriminatory effects. Each of these standards will be addressed in turn.
a. Compactness
Some commentators argue that courts should require states to adopt
the most compact districts possible (subject to the one person, one vote
rule, a requirement that districts be contiguous, 57 and other nonpartisan
rules governing redistricting). For example, Daniel Polsby and Robert
Popper argue that a prima facie case of gerrymandering would be established where plaintiffs proferred a more compact plan than the plan enacted by a state. 58 In response, the state would have to "provide acceptable,
nonpartisan reasons for having drawn its district lines as it did."4 9
Polsby and Popper make three arguments in favor of a compactness stan-

estimates of how much incumbency protection is ideal, and on whether redistricting under a
seats/votes test would cause states to exceed the "ideal" amount of incumbency protection. M. at 227.
456. Cf. Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 5,at 12 (dividing possible tests into "formal" and
"result-oriented" criteria). Lowenstein and Steinberg list numerous criteria for redistricting that are not
addressed below (including representation of racial minorities and proportional representation, among
others). Id. at 11. These criteria are omitted for different reasons. Some of these criteria are omitted
because they are irrelevant to partisan gerrymandering (such as representation of racial minorities).
Others are not discussed because they are already mandated by law (such as equal population) or
foreclosed by law (like proportional representation). Further, other criteria are omitted because, as far
as I know, they have never been suggested as the primary basis for upholding or rejecting redistricting
plans (for example, preserving political subdivisions).
457. A district is contiguous when "every part of the district is reachable from every other part
without crossing the district boundary." Grofman, supra note 21, at 84.
458. Polsby & Popper, supra note 18, at 326.
459. Id.; see also Richard H. Bagger, The Supreme Court and Congressional Apportionment:
Slippery Slope to Equal Representation Gerrymandering, 38 RUTGERs L. REV. 109, 135-36 (1985)
(endorsing a similar rule).
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dard. First, compactness has an "independent normative value... [because] where one lives is a dominant fact in a person's life."' For example, "[tihe strangers that impinge on one's life tend to live nearby rather than far away, and the public concerns of virtually every local community tend first of all to things near to home: property taxes, roads, public
schools,
police and fire service, snow removal, trash collection and so
461
on."
Second, a compactness test would undoubtedly limit gerrymandering
to some extent, because any gerrymander requires that votes "be placed in
appropriate districts. Toward this end, district lines are stretched and
shrunk, and in the process districts become noncompact. Thus, where
compactness is a constraint, a gerrymanderer's job is noticeably
harder." 2
Finally, a compactness test would be easy to implement. Scholars have
created numerous mathematically precise measures of compactness.463
Possible measures include (1) division of "the longest straight line whose.
endpoints were within a district by the longest line perpendicular to it
whose endpoints were also in the district,' 4 4 (2) comparison of "the
length of a district's minimum diameter to the length of its maximum
diameter,"4" (3) division of the "area of a district.., by the area of the
smallest circle which can circumscribe the district,"4" (4) calculating
"the sum of the squared distances of every point in the [district in relation
to its] ... center," 7 (5) a requirement "that the length of all district
lines in a state, when added together, be as short as possible,' 46 and (6)
examining "the effectiveness of a shape's perimeter in capturing
area...
469
[as defined by] the ratio of a [district's] perimeter to its area."
Despite its advantages, a compactness standard has several serious
flaws. First, commentators' inability to agree on an appropriate measure of
compactness may render any compactness-based standards unworkable. If
judges are forced to choose between half a dozen measures of compactness, they may erroneously adopt a measure which would be inadequate or
counterproductive. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that supporters

460. Polsby & Popper, supra note 18, at 338 n.175.
461. Id.
462. Id. at 332.
463. Id. at 339; see also Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 756 n.19 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (describing numerous possible measures of compactness).
464. Polsby & Popper. supra note 18, at 343.
465. Id. at 344.

466. Id.
467. Id. at 345.
468. Id. at 347.
469. Id. at 347 (citing Joseph E. Schwartzberg, Reapportionment, Gertymanders,and the Notion of
"ConlpactnIess.' 50 MINN. L. REv. 443 (1966)).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

63

Florida Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

of one compactness measure are quite critical of other measures.
For example, Polsby and Popper support measuring compactness as
the perimeter/area ratio of a district40 (method (6) above) and state that
methods (1) through (5) respectively do "not adequately discriminate
against partisan behavior,"47' allow "partisans to manipulate district
'
boundaries,"472
may lead to "a bad result, actually a perverse result...
[which] does not prevent gerrymandering, 473 "requires more mathemat'
ics than the average lawyer can command,"474
and "is relatively easy to
7
'
5
subvert." Presumably, supporters of the other five measures would say
similar things about perimeter/area ratios.
Admittedly, any seats/votes test would also require resolution of some
technical issues and some understanding of both politics and arithmetic.
Because most judges know more about politics than they do about geometry, the technical issues surrounding a seats/votes test are far less daunting
than those which must be addressed in order to create an effective compactness rule.
Second, even if some agreed-upon measure of compactness existed, a
compactness standard would be far more inconsistent with Bandemer than
a seats/votes test. In response to Justice Powell's partial reliance on Indiana districts' bizarre shapes, 76 the plurality stated that "deliberate drawing of district lines in accordance with accepted gerrymandering principles
would be relevant to intent," but not to the issue of discriminatory effect.477 Thus, the Supreme Court would have to explicitly reject the
Bandemer plurality's statements in order to adopt a compactness standard.
By contrast, the Court could plausibly harmonize Bandemer and a
seats/votes test by interpreting unusually disproportionate election results,
whether actual or projected, as evidence of consistently degraded minority
party strength.
Third, it is not clear whether compactness-based tests will substantially
restrict gerrymandering. The purposes of any restraint on gerrymandering
are to prevent a minority party from frustrating the will of the
majority478 and to prevent a minority from being dramatically
underrepresented. 479 As regulating the shape of districts does not directly
470. Id. at 348.
471. Id. at 343.
472. Id. at 344.
473. Id. at 344-45.
474. Id. at 346.
475. Id. at 347.
476. Bandemer. 478 U.S. at 173, 178-80 (Powell. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
477. Id. at 141 (plurality opinion). The deliberate drawing of district lines would need to be accompanied by evidence of a partisan legislative process to be relevant to intent. Id. (plurality opinion).
478. Polsby & Popper, supra note 18, at 302.
479. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 133 (plurality opinion) (redistricting plan invalid if it leads to frustra-

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol45/iss3/2

64

Lewyn: How to Limit Gerrymandering
HOW TO LIMIT GERRYMANDERING

affect the seats/votes gap, it is possible that "[g]errymandering may take
4 ' Inplace even though districts are perfectly regular in appearance.""
deed, if one party's support is concentrated in certain areas, a redistricting
plan with compact districts could lead to gerrymandered results.48' Thus,
compactness is neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure nonpartisan
districting.
Fourth, compactness is not always inherently valuable in itself, for two
reasons. First, a compactness requirement may actually fragment "cohesive
communities of interest that are not conveniently concentrated in a compact geographical location but are scattered across a wider area in an
eccentric pattern."48 For example, let us suppose that in city X, which is
dominated by Latinos and non-Latin whites, non-Latin whites live primarily on a ten-mile long strip of land near a bay, and the nearest suburban
concentration of non-Latin whites is several miles inland. A compact
districting plan for any office would fragment white neighborhoods, dividing them between districts shaped like circles or squares and dominated by
inland Latinos. However, it may well be that bayfront non-Latin whites
would be better represented in an odd-looking but more socially homogenous district. Second, the ideal of compactness assumes that socially homogenous districts are desirable. However, it could be argued that "a state
as a whole would be better represented if legislators' districts were not
designed so that their constituents' interests were as narrowly defined as
'
possible,"483
or that compact, socially homogenous districts are so likely
to be "safe" for one party or another that a legislature composed of such
districts would be unresponsive to shifts in public opinion.
As noted above, any proposed standard for defining gerrymandering
should be at least arguably consistent with Bandemer and must be workable.4" A compactness standard is inconsistent with Bandemer, would be
difficult to implement, is an inappropriate means of reaching the question-

tion of majority's will or effective exclusion of minority).
480. Grofman, supra note 21, at 91.
481. Indeed, it has been argued that a compactness requirement "is a Republican Trojan horse"
because Democratic support is concentrated in urban ghettoes. Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 5,
at 27. Contra Polsby & Popper, supra note 18, at 334-35 (questioning existence and effect of such a
"natural gerrymander"); Grofman, supra note 21, at 92 n.67 (contending that Lowenstein and
Steinberg's argument on this issue "is sketchy to the point of nonexistence, and they review no empirical data whatsoever for the United States").
482. Alfange, supra note 79, at 213.
483. Richard G. Niemi, The Relationship Between Votes and Seats: The Ultimate Question in Political Gerrymandering, 33 UCLA L. REV. 185, 189 (1985); see also Gottlieb. supra note 342, at 10
(noting that in drafting the Constitution. Madison "sought a plan which would juxtapose different
groups").
484. See supra text accompanying notes 375-77.
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able goal of homogenous districts, and may not even do much to limit
gerrymandering.
b. DiscriminatoryIntent
Under another process-oriented test, the Court would prohibit "the use
of party voting data or other related criteria"48 5 in redistricting, in order
to prevent gerrymandering. Thus, the legislature's intent, 86 rather than
discriminatory results, would be dispositive because "[b]efore invalidating
an election, the Court would not require a showing that ballot staffers
would have lost absent the fraud. Why should it require disproportionate
effects before invalidating a politically gerrymandered districting
scheme?"4 7
The idea that discriminatory intent alone suffices to invalidate a redistricting plan was flatly rejected in Bandemer. Even the district court,
which struck down Indiana's redistricting plan and was reversed, agreed
with the plurality that the "plaintiffs were required to prove ... an actual
'
discriminatory effect."488
Moreover, the Gaffney Court also rejected the
idea of neutrality, explaining that a "politically mindless approach may
produce, whether intended or not, the most grossly gerrymandered re'
sults."489
Even if politicians somehow manage to create a randomly
drawn plan with computers, the political impact of a plan would almost
certainly be discovered by the time it was adopted, "in which event the
49 Thus, a
results would be both known and, if not changed, intended.""
pure "intent" rule would be difficult to enforce, because politicians might
dissemble instead of being frank about their intent. Inevitably, the courts
would be forced to inquire into legislative motives, and to infer discriminatory intent from discriminatory effects.49' Therefore, a pure "intent"
rule is not only inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, but may in
fact be impossible to enforce unless judges consider the results of a
districting plan.

485. Neil A. Capobianco, Note, Political Gerrymandering-The Unconsintutional Threat to Fair
Representation, 33 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 673, 697-98 (1988).
486. Id. at 697.
487. Id.
488. Bandemer. 478 U.S. at 127 (plurality opinion).
489. Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 753.
490. Id.
491. Cf Alfange, supra note 79, at 229-31 (criticizing attempts to make districting process nonpartisan); Jon M. Anderson, Comment, Politics and Purpose: Hide and Seek in the Gerrymandering
Thicket After Davis v. Bandemer, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 183. 222-28 (1987).
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2. Result-Oriented Tests
Result-oriented tests for detecting gerrymandering are somewhat more
numerous than process-oriented tests. Standards proposed by commentators include: (1) a "totality of the circumstances" test,492 (2) requiring
states to adopt the most symmetrical plan, in other words, the one which
allows each party to win the same share of seats with a given vote
share,493 (3) allowing states to adopt a plan only if "its partisan consequences are likely to have occurred 'naturally,' that is, without conscious
design,"49 (4) computing proposed districts' results in statewide "base
line race" elections, and rejecting a districting plan if a disproportionate
number of districts support the majority party,495 (5) striking down plans
with a high number of noncompetitive seats, as measured by a statistic
known as the "swing ratio," 496 (6) the Badham court's suggestion that a
redistricting plan be rejected only if it adversely affects a group which has
been wholly excluded from the political process, 497 and (7) proportional
representation. 98
a. Totality of the Circumstances
Numerous commentators, 499 as well as Justices Powell and
Stevens," ° have urged courts to weigh various factors in gerrymandering
cases, and to reject a plan if a "totality of the circumstances" supports a
finding of gerrymandering. For example, Gordon Baker has suggested that
courts might consider, inter alia, the following factors in deciding gerrymandering cases: (1) unusual district contours, (2) legislative disregard of
compactness and contiguity, (3) extensive deviation from political subdivision boundaries, (4) fragmentation of communities of interest, (5) legislative intent, (6) the fairness of procedures used to enact a redistricting plan,
(7) discriminatory partisan impact, and (8) a low number of competitive
seats."°

492. See discussion infra part II.C.2.(a).
493. See discussion infra part III.C.2.(b).
494. Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 5. at 61; see discussion infra part 11I.C.2.(c).
495. See discussion infra part III.C.2.(d).
496. See discussion infra part III.C.2.(e).
497. See discussion infra part III.C.2.(f).
498. See discussion infra part III.C.2.(g).
499. E.g., Gordon E. Baker, The "Totality of Circumstances" Approach, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING, supra note 8, at 203-11: Grofman. supra note 352. at 47; Hess. supra note 342. at 21926; Morrill. supra note 363, at 214.
500. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 173 (Powell, J.. concurring in part and dissenting in part); Karcher v.
Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 755-61 (1983) (Stevens. J., concurring).
501. Baker, supra note 499, at 205-10; see also Bandemer 478 U.S. at 173 (Powell, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Karcher v. Daggett. 462 U.S. at 755-61 (Stevens, J., concurring); Hess,
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Supporters of the totality test make three arguments. First, it has been
argued that Bandemer should not foreclose the totality test because "the
totality argument was never made to the Bandemer Court ... [which
therefore] cannot be said to have rejected what it did not review. 50 2 This
argument is supported by the plurality's statement that the factors cited by
Justice Powell are not "entirely irrelevant"5 3 because "district configurations may be combined with vote projections to predict future election
results, which are also relevant to the effects showing.""° It has been
argued that if irregular district configurations and disproportionate impact
are relevant to discriminatory effects, other factors cited by Justice
Powell-such as compactness, adherence to political subdivision
boundaries, irregular legislative procedure, and legislative intent0 5 -are
also relevant if plaintiffs "tie these factors to specific [discriminatory]
effects." 5" However, other statements in the Bandemer plurality opinion
suggest that a totality test could not be harmonized with Bandemer without substantial revision. The Bandemer plurality stated that "evidence of
exclusive legislative process and deliberate drawing of district lines in
accordance with accepted gerrymandering principles would be relevant to
intent."5 7 If discriminatory intent and discriminatory effect were shown
by plaintiffs, the state could rebut by showing "evidence of valid...
configuration [which] would be relevant to whether the districting plan
met legitimate state interests.""5 8 Thus, Bandemer appears to reject Justice Powell's totality test, which would weigh every relevant factor, in
favor of discrete inquiries into discriminatory intent, discriminatory effect,
and state justification for an otherwise invalid gerrymander. Each of these
inquiries would consider some, but not all, of the factors suggested by
Justice Powell and other supporters of a totality test.
Second, it has been argued that a totality test is arguably more workable than other possible standards, because it would give courts the flexibility to consider factors that narrower tests disregard. For instance, Bernard Grofman notes that seats/votes tests may understate the discriminatory effects of gerrymanders which displace the minority party's incumbents.
because the "incumbency displacement will reduce the observed discrepancy between votes and seats by reducing the votes of the party that has its
incumbents eliminated by gerrymandering, and thus reduce the appearance

supra note 342, at 222-26: Grofman, supra note 21. at 117-19.
502. Hess, supra note 342, at 226.
503. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 141 (plurality opinion).
504. Id. (plurality opinion).
505. Id. at 173 (Powell, J.. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
506. Hess, supra note 342, at 227.
507. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 141 (plurality opinion).
508. Id. (plurality opinion).
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of gerrymandering." 5 9 By contrast, a totality test would allow the courts
to consider problems like incumbent displacement that occur in some but
not all redistricting cases.
Despite this advantage, the totality test's vagueness renders it unworkable. Under a totality test, no judge, and therefore no district drawer,
would have any definite way of knowing "how much compactness is
required, how few subdivision lines must be split, the criteria for making
tradeoffs required by simultaneously applying multiple and quite possibly
conflicting criteria, or even how much perfunctory participation the controlling legislative caucus must allow the minority."5 ' As a result, district drawers governed by the totality test would have no way to tell if
they had drawn a constitutional plan,5 " and any redistricting plan could
be challenged in court.5" 2
Third, it has been argued that the courts could make sense of the
totality test because they have done so in cases under the Voting Rights
Act." 3 Under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, a voting procedure,
including a districting plan, is illegal if "based on the totality of circumstances,"5" 4 members of an ethnic or language minority "have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice."5" 5 The totality test,
as described in the legislative history, requires courts to weigh at least
seven factors. 1 6
Shortly after the present version of section 2 was enacted, the Supreme Court was forced to clarify the law by developing a three-part test
which section 2 plaintiffs were required to meet." 7 Under this test, plaintiffs challenging multimember districts must show that a minority group is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a

509. Grofman, supra note 352, at 96.
510. Backstrom et al., supra note 344. at 156.
511. Id. at 154.
512. See McDonald & Engstrom, supra note 8. at 182 (noting that the totality test "will not be of
much assistance to legislators during the process of choosing lines, inasmuch as the totality can almost
always be debated" and the totality test will therefore foster "ambiguity and possible capriciousness").
513. See Baker, supra note 499, at 203-04 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973 and noting "striking similarities" between issues arising under the Act and those arising under Bandemer).
514. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
515. Id.
516. The factors include, inter alia, (1) a jurisdiction's history of official discrimination, (2) racial
polarization in voting, (3) the use of practices which restrict minority representation (e.g., large districts, majority vote requirements), (4) refusal to give minorities access to a candidate slating process.
(5) discrimination in areas affecting the opportunity to participate in the political process. (6) overt or
subtle racial appeals in campaigns, and (7) the extent of minority success in elections. Grofman, supra
note 21, at 130 n.227 (citation omitted). Obviously, most of these factors are not relevant to partisan

gerrymandering cases. See id.
517. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).
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single-member district, that the minority group is politically cohesive, and
that bloc voting by the majority (usually whites) usually defeats the
minority's preferred candidate."' Thus, it appears that the totality test
was not workable even in Voting Rights Act cases.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the section 2 totality test is inapplicable to partisan gerrymandering cases, because all three
elements of the Voting Rights Act test are satisfied in most partisan gerrymandering cases.519 The minority party (1) nearly always can elect one
or two state legislators and, in any state with more than a few U.S. Representatives, a representative as well, (2) is usually politically cohesive, and
(3) will usually lose some districts because of bloc voting by the other
party's supporters. 2 Thus, the courts cannot decide partisan gerrymandering cases by applying the totality test of the Voting Rights Act.
b. Neutrality and Symmetry
Some experts have urged courts to require neutral redistricting by
mandating a neutral, but nonproportional, result rather than a nonpartisan
redistricting process.12 ' For example, one scholar states that "neutrality
can best be defined by symmetry. 522 Symmetry means that "if one party
wins y seats for x percent of the vote, the other party should also win
approximately y seats [if it wins] for x percent of the vote. 523 Thus.
symmetry does not prevent the majority party from gaining a victory
bonus as long as the minority party would gain a similar victory bonus if
it became the majority. 4 Unfortunately, it is impossible to calculate
how the minority party would have done if it had won more votes, since
vote switches are not uniformly distributed across districts 525 Even if
vote switches were uniformly distributed across districts, it is not clear
how to create a plan which would allow the parties to win exactly the
5 26
same share of the seats with the same share of the vote.
Finally, even if a symmetrical plan could be created, it might yield

518. Id.
519. See McDonald & Engstrom. supra note 8,at 198 (applying Gingles to political gerrymandering).
520. See id. The Supreme Court in Gingles specifically referred to the "white" vote. Gingles. 478
U.S. at 50-51. Here the white vote is analogous to a political, rather than racial, majority.
521. Gottlieb, supra note 342, at 11.
522. Id.
523. Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 5, at 55.
524. Id. In other words. "symmetry can accommodate the strong tendency for majority parties to
receive disproportionate seat majorities." /d.
525. Id. at 56-57.
526. See id. at 56 (stating that it is impossible to know hypothetical results if the other party had
won).
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results similar to those created by a gerrymander. 27 For instance, if a
state was 60% Democratic and every district was 60% Democratic, the
plan would be symmetrical but nevertheless unfair, because the minority
party would get no districts with-only 40% of the votes.52
Other commentators have sought to create some degree of symmetry
by requiring a plan that is in between the most extreme plan in favor of
one party and the most extreme plan in favor of another.529 For example,
Michael McDonald and Richard Engstrom have proposed the following
test: First, a computer "would construct every possible plan meeting population and contiguity requirements.""53 Second, district drawers should
calculate the symmetry of each possible districting plan through a statistic
53 Third, district drawers should calculate the stanknown as "skewness.""
dard deviation for each possible districting plan.532 The standard deviation is a statistic which "describes the general degree of dispersion of the
' Thus, a plan with a low standard
_group percentages around the mean."533
deviation has districts that are quite similar.5" For example, a gerrymander which fragments, or "cracks" the minority party's support by splitting
the minority among numerous districts, thus giving the minority party
"large but inefficacious minorities" in each district will have a low standard deviation.535 By contrast, a gerrymander which "packs" all minority
party voters into a few districts will have a high standard deviation, since
the districts will be quite differefit.536 Thus, a neutral plan will have a
527. See id. at 58-59 (suggesting that a symmetry plan can still lead to unfair results).
528. McDonald & Engstrom, supra note 8,at 185.
529. See id. at 179.
530. Still, supra note 340, at 1033 (citing McDonald & Engstrom, supra note 8,at 179).
531. McDonald & Engstrom, supra note 8, at 195. "Skewness" is a statistic measuring the symmetry of a distribution of possible outcomes. Id. Thus. a perfectly symmetrical districting plan has a
skewness of zero. Id. Under such a plan, every district would either reflect the statewide party balance
or differ from the statewide balance by the same margin as another district favoring the opposing party. Id. at 189. For instance, if a state is 51-49 Republican and has three districts, one district is 51-49
Republican, and another district is five points more Republican than the state as a whole (i.e.. 56%
Republican), the third district should be five points more Democratic than the state as a whole (i.e.,
54% Democratic). Id. By contrast. "the absence of perfect symmetry means one group is more or less
'packed'; one group has its voters concentrated into a relatively small number of districts compared to
the other group." Id. If a party's support is measured, and its "mean [statewide support] is higher than
the median, the distribution [of voters] may be said to be positively skewed; when the mean is lower
than the median, the distribution is negatively skewed." RICHARD P. RUNYON & AUDREY MABER,
FUNDAMENTALS OF BEHAVIORAL STATISTICS 86 (1976). For a more technical discussion of skewness,
see id. at 51, 85-6; THAD R. HARSHBARGER, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS: A DECISION MAP 79. 105-06
(2d ed. 1976).
532. McDonald & Engstrom, supra note 8,at 189.
533. Id.
534. See id. at 189-91.
535. Id. at 191.
536. Cf.id.at 189-91 (explaining that a lower standard deviation indicates group percentages are
closer to the mean, and vice versa).
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high degree of skewness and an average standard deviation."' Fourth,
"the linedrawers would determine the number of districts each party would
be expected to win"53 under a districting plan with "perfect symmetry
' This figure would
and a[n] [average] standard deviation."539
rely on "empirical research that has shown that the percentage of seats won by two
parties is roughly proportional to the cube of their respective vote
percentages." 5" Fifth, after the likely results of each districting plan have
been calculated, district drawers should (1) accept arrangements with a
partisan balance similar to the likely partisan balance in a plan with perfect symmetry and an average standard deviation, 4 ' (2) among the
schemes acceptable under (1) "accept the arrangement that is most symmetrical and has a standard deviation most nearly equal to the expected
[average] value, 54 2 and (3) "[i]f there is not just one single arrangement
that dominates all others on both symmetry and dispersion [standard deviation], then exclude any plan that is dominated by another and select
'
any one from among the undominated set."543
Thus, the modified symmetry test requires district drawers and courts to balance three factors:
symmetry, closeness to an average standard deviation, and unusually disproportionate results.5"
The major advantage of the modified symmetry test is that it encourages symmetry and would "not allow one to move so far toward avoiding
cracking so as to institute packing, nor can one move so far toward avoiding packing as to institute cracking. '
Although the modified symmetry test is not obviously contradicted by
Bandemer, its workability and fairness are questionable, for two reasons.
First, any plan which requires legislatures to adopt one "ideal" plan (such
as a plan with a high symmetry level and an average standard deviation),
or one of several such plans, necessarily deprives state legislatures of most
of their discretion over redistricting. 46 In a federalist system, such draconian rules should be highly disfavored, because a rule requiring states to

537. Id. at 195 (suggesting that the best scheme will permit neither packing nor cracking, and will
have the lowest skewness).
538. Still, supra note 340, at 1033 (citing McDonald & Engstrom, supra note 8. at 194).
539. McDonald & Engstrom, supra note 8. at 193.
540. Still, supra note 340, at 1033 (citing McDonald & Engstrom. supra note 8. at 194). For example, if the minority party has 47% of the vote, the expected standard deviation is 13.4, and districts
are perfectly symmetrical, the minority party should win 41% of the districts. Id. at 1033 n.74.
541. McDonald & Engstrom, supra note 8. at 193-95.
542. Id. at 194. McDonald & Engstrom also suggest that district drawers be allowed to consider
the compactness of proposed districts. Id. at 199.
543. Id. at 195.
544. Id. at 193-95.
545. Id.
546. See generally id. at 187 (noting politicians' interest in affecting redistricting lines).
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adopt the "one best plan" might force every state into endless litigation.
Even if district drawers thought their plans were the best possible plans
under the modified symmetry test, interests disadvantaged by a redistricting plan would challenge its technical imperfections. By contrast, a bipartisan compromise test would deter litigation by barring challenges to most
bipartisan districting plans. 47
Second, the modified symmetry test may be too complex to be easily
applied by district drawers and federal judges, because most lawyers and
legislators probably would not know a standard deviation from a shillelagh. It follows that if any technical difficulties548 arise in the application
of the test, district drawers and judges are unlikely to reach the correct
answer. By contrast, less technical seats/votes tests require judges and
politicians to have a lot of information and a keen understanding of the
political process-both of which are more common in courtrooms and
legislative chambers than expertise in calculus or statistics."
c. The "Chalk Test" and Random Districting
Another possible rule would require courts to uphold a districting plan
only if "its partisan consequences are likely to have occurred 'naturally,'
that is, without conscious design."55 Under this test, the court would
proceed as follows: First, program a computer to randomly create a large
number of possible plans with varying partisan outcomes.55' Second, determine the likelihood of each possible outcome, in order "to determine
the probability that the predicted [partisan] outcome of the plan being
tested could have occurred randomly. 552 Third, "[i]f this probability is
too low, then the plan is regarded as defective and ... [should] be struck
' This method has been described as the "chalk test" because a
down."553
"chalk player" is a gambler who bets on favorites. 54
The chalk test is not particularly useful as a means of preventing
gerrymandering, because "[t]he fairness of the likely partisan outcome
under a plan has nothing at all to do with how many different plans could

547. See supra text accompanying notes 413-14.
548. See McDonald & Engstrom, supra note 8, at 198-201 (describing possible technical problems
including appropriate ways of measuring party allegiance, relevance of compactness, and possibility
that computers could "produce sets of 'all possible' district plans that differ in important respects").
549. Id. at 62-63 n.153.
550. Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 5, at 61; see also Engstrom, supra note 15, at 316-17
(proposing a similar test).
551. Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 5. at-61.
552. Id. at 61-62.
553. Id. at 62.
554. I. at 61 n.149.
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have been drawn to yield the same outcome." ' Indeed, the chalk test
strongly favors the majority party because "the great majority of possible
ways to draw lines usually benefit the majority party." 5 6 For example,
one chalk test experiment involved Iowa's 1970 congressional redistricting."5 7 Although the Republicans had received only 54% of the statewide
congressional vote in 1968, 541 of 700 randomly generated districting
plans gave the Republicans a 4-2 majority, eighty-one led to 5-1 Republican majorities, and only seventy-seven yielded a nearly proportional 3-3
split.558 Thus, it appears the chalk test would probably degrade the minority party's influence to the same extent as a gerrymander-obviously
an absurd outcome.
d. The "Base Line Race" Test
Another test relies on "base line races" to detect gerrymandering.559
Under this test, the court must determine "the number of districts in which
the majority party adherents dominate,"" as determined by the results of
a "base line race"--defined as "a previous statewide election in which the
choice between candidates appears to have been largely determined by
partisan sentiments of the voters rather than transient issues or grossly dissimilar charismatic personal appeal of the candidates."56 A district is
"majority-dominated" if its support in the district exceeds its statewide
percentage. 2 Under this test, courts should reject a redistricting plan as
an unconstitutional gerrymander if the number of majority-dominated
districts is "other than one over 50% of the districts ... unless further
'
adjustments of district lines are impossible."563
The base line race approach has numerous advantages. Because the
base line race test relies on statewide election results, courts need not
adjust for the power of incumbency, transient issues, or the "grossly dissimilar charismatic personal appeal"5" of a party's individual legislative
candidates. Second, the base line race test does not force courts to abolish
the victory bonus which the majority party ordinarily receives under single-member districting.565 Third, the base line race test does not force

555.
556.
557.
558.
559.
560.
561.
562.
563.
564.
565.

Id. at 62.
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 62-63 n.153.
Id.
Backstrom et al., supra note 344, at 160.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 163.
i. at 164.
Id. at 160.
See Cain, supra note 453, at 141.
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judges to become mathematical experts, since it requires courts to answer
one easily understood question: In how many districts is the majority party
stronger than it is statewide?5"
Nevertheless, the base line race test has three disadvantages. First, the
base line race test may become extremely inflexible because it allows only
one type of plan: a plan in which the majority party controls just over half
the districts. 67 Although the base line race test is not as inflexible as a
proportional representation standard,568 it may give district drawers very
little leeway to make political compromises, consider differences between
legislative voting patterns and voting patterns in other elections, or consider nonpartisan factors like preservation of social communities of interest.
By contrast, a bipartisan compromise test allows district drawers to adopt
any plan which does not deviate "too much" from proportionality.
Second, judgments about what courts will define as a base line race
are so subjective that no district drawer can possibly decide when a plan is
unconstitutional. In order to ascertain how courts will calculate base race
returns, district drawers must answer three questions:
1. Will courts examine election returns for one office or for sever5 69

al?

2. If the courts consider election results for just one office, which
office will it be? The authors of the base race test admit that "[w]hat is a
suitable base race to estimate partisan strength will not be the same in every state."57
3. No matter what base line races the courts consider, will they consider election returns from one election year or several?57'
If a state has several statewide elections every two years, there are
dozens of possible combinations of base line races which courts could rely
upon, especially if races are assigned different weights. 7 2 Thus, district
drawers will often "have no way, even with the best of intentions, to tell
whether they have drawn a fair plan." 73 For the same reason, in the absence of arbitrary judicial rules as to what constitutes a base line race,
nearly any districting plan will be open to a constitutional challenge.
Therefore, the base line race rule will make it extremely difficult for dis-

566. See generally Backstrom et al., supra note 344. at 161-64 (proposing the base line race test).
567. See id. at 160.
568. See id. at 164-65.
569. See id. at 161.
570. Id.
571. Cf. Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634. 657-58 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (rejecting
weighted results of statewide races against each other because they were "subjective" and considered
only one election).
572. Id.
573. Backstrom et al., supra note 344, at 156 (criticizing other proposed rules).
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trict drawers to avoid litigation.
By contrast, a bipartisan compromise test would bar almost all gerry57 4
mandering lawsuits in states with a bipartisan redistricting process.
Even in more partisan states, district drawers could gain a rough idea of
how much of a "victory bonus" was acceptable by looking at past legislative election returns in bipartisan states of similar size.
Third, the base line race method will often lead to erroneous decisions.
Under an ideal districting standard, courts should uphold districting plans
not generally regarded as gerrymanders. Under the base line race test,
courts would reject many such plans.
For example, I tested the base line race method by applying it to the
1982-90 congressional districting plans of New York and Illinois. The
New York plan is generally believed to be bipartisan, while the Illinois
plan is generally regarded as a partisan Democratic plan.575 Thus, a sensible gerrymandering test would require courts to uphold the New York
plan, and either reject the Illinois plan as a Democratic gerrymander or
uphold it as a de minimis deviation from proportionality.
In evaluating the New York plan, I used the 1976 senatorial race576
as a base line race because the Democratic candidate's percentage of the
two-party vote, 55%577 was nearly identical to the Democrats' 1982-90
share of the congressional vote. The Republican share of the base line race
vote in the 1980s congressional districts exceeded the party's statewide
share in twenty-one of thirty-four congressional districts.578 Thus, the
base line race method would have falsely labelled the New York plan as a
Republican gerrymander.
In evaluating the Illinois plan, I used the 1980 U.S. Senate race as the
base line race. The Democratic candidate won 56.8% of the statewide vote
in that election,579 only about two points more than the Democrats'
1982-90 congressional vote share."'
574. According to one study, only about half the states had partisan redistricting plans. See
Morrill, supra note 363, at 222-23 (describing 23 of 44 congressional districting plans in states with
more than one U.S. Representative as "strong partisan," "weak partisan" or "court partisan," 10 states
as "bipartisan," and II as having court or commission-drawn nonpartisan plans).
575. See Gottron, supra note 363, at 153, 361.
576. Ideally, I would have used an obscure race in which voters were unaware of candidates'
personalities. However, even the authors of the base line race test support using high-profile statewide
races where the parties' statewide totals reflect the state's partisan balance. See Backstrom et al., supra
note 7, at 1141 (using gubernatorial election as a "base race" where the Democratic candidate's percentage was close to the party's "normal vote").
577. 32 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1976, at 841 (1976); see
also supra note 365 and accompanying text (noting 1982-90 congressional vote totals for New York).
578. Gottron, supra note 363. at 364-99 (listing district-by-district returns).
579. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC.. POLITICS IN AMERICA, MEMBERS OF CONGRESS IN WASHINGTON AND AT HOME 1986. at 422 (Alan Ehrenhalt ed., 1985).

580. See supra note 422 and accompanying text (noting that the 1982-90 Republican vote share in
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The Republican candidate's vote share in this base line race exceeded
his statewide vote total in fourteen of twenty-two districts."' Thus, under
the base line race test, the Illinois districting plan, generally regarded as a
Democratic gerrymander, would be struck down as a Republican gerrymander!
The inaccuracies of the base line race test should not be surprising,
because a standard which relies on elections for other offices is unlikely to
predict the results of legislative elections. 5 2 For example, in Hastert v.
State Board of Elections83 two experts disagreed as to the likely consequences of a Republican-drawn districting plan for Illinois which the court
chose to adopt. One expert divided districts between the party based on
the results of statewide base line races, and testified that Republicans
would usually win 10-11 of Illinois' twenty congressional seats. 84 The
other expert divided districts based on past congressional election results,
and found that the Republicans would win 7-9 seats. 85
In 1992, the Republicans elected eight legislators 5 ---about the number predicted by the expert who relied on congressional results, but fewer
than the number predicted by the expert who relied on base races. 87 As
legislator won with under 55% of the vote, 8 the 1992 results were not a
fluke caused by one or two close elections. In sum, even if district drawers could predict what courts would define as a base line race, the base
line race method might well become highly inflexible and could lead to
absurd results.
e. The "Swing Ratio" and Competitiveness
Richard Niemi has suggested that courts adjudicating gerrymandering
cases examine the "swing ratio," which is "the rate at which seats change
as votes change." More formally, it is "the change in the proportion of
seats won by a party when there is a one percent change in the votes won

Illinois was 45.8%).
581. Gottron, supra note 363, at 156-77 (listing district-by-district returns).
582. See supra text accompanying notes 569-70.
583. 777 F. Supp. 634, 657 (N.D. I11.1991).
584. Id. The court noted that the expert's analysis was not based solely on base line races, but
employed a weighted average of the results of several statewide races. Id. at 658. The court had no
objection to such data manipulations so long as they were reasonable, but gave no indication as to
what type of manipulation was reasonable. Id.
585. Id. at 656. However, the experts disagreed partially because they also disagreed as to the
parties' likely statewide vote. Id. The Democrats' expert erroneously assumed that the state was evenly
divided between the parties, while the Republicans' expert correctly assumed that the Democrats were
the majority party. Id. at 656 n.35.
586. WORLD ALMANAC. supra note 368, at 107.
587. See supra notes 584-85 and accompanying text.
588. WORLD ALMANAC. supra note 368. at 107-08.
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by that party." '89 For example, if the Republicans gain two percent more
seats when they win one percent more votes, the swing ratio is two.
The effect of a high swing ratio is "that, if a party gains votes, it gains
seats at a relatively rapid rate and, if it loses votes, it loses seats at an
equally rapid rate."'' Thus, the "main utility of the swing ratio lies in
preserving competitiveness between the parties.""59 Niemi suggests that
one key issue in gerrymandering cases should be "whether the swing ratio
associated with a particular plan is particularly low in comparison with
historical experience in the jurisdiction in question. 592
However, even Niemi admits that because (1) there is no ideal swing
ratio and (2) courts should consider goals other than competitiveness in
calculating districting plans,593 "the swing ratio approach is unlikely to
yield a unique, simple, and easily interpretable measure, such as exists for
population equality. Nonetheless, as one measure of districting quality, to
be used alongside other measures, it may prove useful."5" Thus, Niemi
implicitly admits that the swing ratio should merely be a factor in a totality of the circumstances analysis, rather than an independent test for determining the validity of a districting plan.
f. Total Exclusion from the PoliticalProcess
It could be argued that courts should apply the Badham court's rule
that only groups wholly shut out from the political process should be able
to raise gerrymandering claims.595 Under this test, gerrymandering claims
could be raised only "when there is a genuine civil rights violation against
an oppressed group ...[as opposed to] routine partisan disputes between
'
Democrats and Republicans."596
Two major arguments have been made in support of the Badham rule.

589. Richard G. Niemi, The Swing Ratio as a Measure of Partisan Gerrymandering,in POLITICAL
GERRYMANDERING. supra note 8. at 171, 171-72.

590. Niemi, supra note 483, at 200.
591. Id.
592. Niemi. supra note 589, at 176.
593. Id. at 176-77.
594. Id. Indeed, the "swing ratio" could be used as part of the "bipartisan compromise" test. For
example, if a plan has an unusually high seats/votes gap, the state could argue the plan is not an unconstitutional gerrymander because it has a large number of highly competitive seats (i.e., seats which
could change parties in response to a small change in the statewide vote), and could rely on the plan's
swing ratio to support such a defense. See supra note 358 and accompanying text.
595. See Badham v. March Fong Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664. 670-73 (N.D. Cal. 1988), affd men., 488
U.S. 1024 (1989); Lowenstein. supra note 161, at 115 n.49 (noting that in a footnote to an article
proposing that only "pariah groups" could raise claims under Bandemer, the author states that Badhani
"adopted an interpretation of Bandemer quite similar to the one I propose.").
596. Lowenstein, supra note 161. at 95.
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First, it has been argued that Bandemer mandates the Badham rule.597
This argument has been thoroughly rebutted above.598 Second, it has
been argued that Bandemer is wrong, and that Badham correctly turns
Bandemer into a "dead letter."5 A full discussion of whether Bandemer
was correctly decided is beyond the scope of this article, because the
constitutionality of gerrymandering has already been addressed adequately
by numerous commentators.' However, the major argument against allowing courts to adjudicate gerrymandering claims, especially those involving major political parties, is that "courts attempting to adjudicate
partisan gerrymandering claims will find it impossible to vindicate those
claims unless they adopt a proportional representation standard. '' "i However, all of the tests discussed above stop short of proportional representation: that is, under any of the tests, some redistricting plans which do not
achieve proportional representation will be upheld. Thus, the dispositive
issue is not whether Bandemer leads to proportional representation, but
whether any conceivable middle ground between Badham and proportional
representation is judicially manageable. For the reasons stated above, I
maintain that at least one test (some variant of my bipartisan compromise
test) is workable.
g. Why Not ProportionalRepresentation?
In Reynolds, the Court stated that "[flull and effective participation by
all citizens in state governments requires therefore, that each citizen have
an equally effective voice in the election of members of his state legislature."' Some commentators have interpreted the concept of "equally
effective" representation to mean that equal protection requires proportional representation.' These commentators say votes are not "equally effective" unless "each voter has an equal amount of power over the decisions of her representative once elected. This can be achieved fully only
through proportional representation.., which ensures that each voter has
an equal share in a representative he actually voted for."' By contrast,
597. Id. at 69-90.
598. See supra part III.B.3.a.(l); see also Grofman. supra note 352, at 47-53 (criticizing the
Badham rule).

599. Moore. supra note 10, at 995-97.
600. See, e.g., Polsby & Popper, supra note 18. at 304-26 (endorsing judicial remedy for partisan
gerrymandering). But see Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 5, at 64-75 (contending that partisan
gerrymandering claims should be nonjusticiable); Moore, supra note 10, at 991-1010. See generally
supra part II.C.4.(c) (discussing arguments for and against constitutional restriction on gerrymandering).
601. Schuck, supra note 32, at 240.
602. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
603. Low-Beer, supra note 5, at 164 n.3.
604. Id.; see also Mary A. Inman. Comment. C.P.R. (Change Through ProportionalRepresen-
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under single-member districting a minority voter may actually be worse
off than if she lives in a malapportioned district, because
"[m]alapportionment reduces the weight of the individual's vote, but not
to zero; gerrymandering in contrast, completely wastes an opposition
vote."6 5 Although "neutral," nongerrymandered single-member
districting reduces the number of "wasted votes." it does not eliminate the
problem, because under any single-member system supporters of a losing
candidate will not have contributed to the election of their representative.'
Supporters of proportional representation (PR) add that even if PR is
not constitutionally required, it is desirable as a matter of policy, for several reasons. First, PR has been successfully used in other countries. Most
European democracies use PR, and "[m]any of these countries have long
histories of successful democratic government." 7 In order to prevent a
multiplication of parties or an elimination of geographical representation,
states could combine PR and geographical representation. For example, in
West Germany, half of the national legislature is elected through PR and
half are elected through single-member districts." 6 Similarly, courts
could allow states to apply PR in relatively small multimember districts.' Second, PR is the only system which fully accommodates both
majority rule and minority representation,6 10 because political minorities
are represented through minority parties but cannot govern unless they join
a broader coalition. Third, PR is simpler than any other possible
antigerrymandering rule, and would eliminate decennial redistricting disputes.6" Fourth, PR would increase party cohesion, because voters would
be able to support a party rather than an individual legislator.6t 2 Fifth,
PR might increase voter turnout and the legitimacy of the political system,6" 3 by ensuring that even the most unpopular points of view are represented.6" 4
Although PR may be desirable as a matter of policy, it cannot easily
be described as a constitutional right. In Bandemer, all nine Justices explicitly repudiated the idea of proportional representation.6"5 As various
tation): Resuscitating a Federal Electoral System, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1991 (1993).
605. Low-Beer, supra note 5,at 181.
606. Id.
607. Id. at 185 n.99.
608. Id. at 187-88.
609. Id. at 187 n.104.
610. Id. at 164.
611. Inman, supra note 604, at 2024-25.
612. Low-Beer, supra note 5, at 164.
613. Inman, supra note 604, at 2008-09.
614. Low-Beer, supra note 5, at 183.
615. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 130 (plurality opinion), id. at 145 (O'Connor, J.. concurring): id.
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Justices noted, nothing in the traditions of this country, the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment or the Court's earlier case law6t6 supports the
theory that voters must have an equal amount of influence over their representative. Even supporters of PR concede that "PR has not found as
fertile ground in the United States as abroad. 61 7
Furthermore, the rationale for PR, if taken seriously, leads to rules far
more radical than even its supporters would endorse. For example, most
PR systems set some threshold for representation, such as one percent or
five percent, 6 8 so that a party which gets 0.5% of the vote would be unrepresented in the legislature. It follows that even under PR, the votes of
the smallest minority groups would be wasted, and their constitutional
rights would be violated, to the same extent as under the present system.61 9 Similarly, some advocates of PR support compromises to allow
geographic subunits to be represented, such as allowing some legislators to
be elected through single-member districts.62 However, if single-member
districts are unconstitutional merely because they waste opposition votes,
it follows that a system with 50% single-member districts is as unconstitutional as a system dominated by single-member districts. Indeed. a constitutional PR"rule might even affect presidential elections. Although presidential elections are governed by Article I of the Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment follows, and therefore modifies, Article I. It logically
follows that if the Fourteenth Amendment requires PR, the requirement
could be applied to presidential elections so that states' electoral votes
would be allocated through PR.6 '
As a matter of policy, PR may be undesirable because PR would make
states ungovernable where the executive and legislative branches of government are controlled by different parties.622

at 169 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
616. Id. at 145 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
617. Low-Beer, supra note 5, at 186. However, some American cities have experimented with PR.
Id. at 186 n.103.
618. Levinson, supra note 279, at 273-74.
619. Inman, supra note 604, at 1993-94.
620. Low-Beer, supra note 5, at 185-88.
621. Levinson, supra note 279, at 279-81. However, Senate elections would be unaffected because
the Seventeenth Amendment, which was enacted after the Fourteenth Amendment, reiterates the rule
that each state is entitled to two senators. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. Obviously, statewide PR is impractical in Senate elections, since only one senator may be elected at a time.
622. I admit that statewide PR may make government more efficient where the executive and
legislative branches are controlled by the same majority party or coalition, because the legislator would
probably be nominated by the party, and would follow the "party line" set by the executive. By contrast, under today's system of district elections, "the enactment of party programs is electorally not
very important to members ....What is important to each congressman, and vitally so, is that he be
free to take positions that serve his advantage." DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL
CONNECTION 99 (1974).
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To understand why, imagine the following hypothetical: The governor
of state X is Republican, and the legislature is 60% Democratic and 40%
Republican. 623 Under a single-member district system, a party's candidates will be nominated through primaries, and some Democrats will be
more centrist than the rest of their party in order to attract "split-ticket"
voters. Thus, divided government need not lead to chaos because a Republican governor may be able to govern by forming a "conservative coalition" of Republicans and moderate Democrats.
By contrast, under a statewide PR system, a party's candidates will be
nominated by and accountable to a party bureaucracy.624 Thus, the majority party's legislators, or those of each party within a majority coalition.
will be ideologically homogenous and politically cohesive. Thus, the governor will probably be unable to attract moderate Democrats' support, and
will therefore be ineffective.625
Admittedly, such gridlock might be avoided through a modified PR
system which allows voters to support individual candidates instead of
parties. For example, under a "cumulative voting" system, "a voter has as
many votes as there are seats to be filled and may cumulate them among a
smaller number of candidates.
Similarly, the "single transferable
vote" (STV) system allows voters to number all "candidates in the order
of their preference from favorite to least favorite,"627 so that once a
voter's first choice has accumulated the minimum number of votes needed
for election, 62' her "surplus votes" are transferred to the voter's second
choice "or [to] the next sequential choice who is not already elected. 6 9
Although STV seems mind-numbingly complex, it can minimize the num-

623. The same analysis, of course, would apply if the President was a Republican, and the House
of Representatives was elected through statewide PR. See id.
624. See Levinson, supra note 279, at 273. This is true for two reasons. First, under statewide PR.
voters vote for a party and, therefore, cannot "split their ticket" in order to support unusually moderate
members of the opposing party. Second, where dozens of legislators must be "slated." it would be impractical to nominate them through a primary. Id.
625, My argument suggests that PR would lead to an overly stable, permanently 'gridlocked."
government, and thereby contradicts the popular argument that PR causes political instability because
it creates "congeries of political parties each organized around a narrow base of issues." Levinson.
supra note 279. at 272. However. the "instability" argument against PR makes little sense where there
is an independent executive, because the survival of the executive branch would "not depend on the
support of a stable legislative coalition." Low-Beer, supra note 5, at 185 n.100.
626. Inman, supra note 604, at 2000 n.35 (citation omitted).
627. Id. at 2000.
628. The minimum percentage required for election under STV will usually be just over one divided by the number of seats plus one. Thus, if one seat is at stake, a candidate can win with no less than
1/2 of the votes (plus one), and if nine seats are at stake a candidate can win with 1/10 of the votes
(plus one). Id. at 2001 n.38 (explaining mathematics in detail); see also Guinier. supra note 232. at
1139 n.299 (computing the threshold for victory is similar under cumulative voting).
629. Inman. supra note 604, at 2001.
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ber of wasted votes. 3 ' The STV system has been utilized in elections for
the Irish Parliament, the Australian Senate, the Cambridge, Massachusetts
City Council, and the New York City school board.63'
STV and cumulative voting are actually more impractical than statewide PR, for two reasons. First, because legislators will not be selected by
63 2
parties. either through primaries or through a central party apparatus,
party ties would be even weaker than they are now, and the legislature
could never be held collectively responsible for its deeds. As a result,
voters would be unable to fix blame for governmental incompetence, even
when all branches of government are run by the same party. Second, STV
supporters admit that in large states "like California, New York, and Texas, it may be necessary to adopt multimember rather than at-large
' because even the most educated voter is incapable of ranking
districts"633
hundreds of candidates. For the same reason, STV and cumulative voting
could not function on a statewide level in state legislative elections. As a
result, most elections would be held in small multimember districts, and
groups would have to get a far higher level of support to elect a candidate
than under a statewide PR system.634 Thus, modified PR systems, like
STV and cumulative voting, are actually less effective at preventing wasted votes than are statewide PR systems.
IV. CONCLUSION

If, as the Bandemer Court held, an unusually egregious partisan" gerrymander is unconstitutional, the courts must decide what separates a permissible redistricting plan from an unconstitutional gerrymander. In order
to resolve this question, lower courts must answer two questions. First, the
courts must decide what Bandemer commands or forecloses. For the reasons stated above, I conclude that Bandemer is indeterminate, except insofar as it specifically rejects certain possible rules. Specifically, I reject the
theory that Bandemer excludes claims by major political parties, as opposed to minor parties or other social groups which have been shut out of
the political process.
Second, the courts must choose the most workable and sensible stan630. Id. at 2002.
631. Id. at 2000 n.32.
632. See id. at 2015.
633. Id. at 2005 n.59.
634. Even if only four seats are at stake (and a candidate could therefore be elected with 20% of
the votes plus one). voters would choose among at least eight major party candidates. Thus, it is unlikely that districts would include more than 5-10 seats. It follows from this that cumulative voting and
STV may be quite practical in small, nonpartisan legislative bodies such as city councils, because the
threshold of exclusion for such bodies could not be lowered through jurisdiction-wide PR. Cf.Guinier.
supra note.232, at 1138-40 (endorsing cumulative voting in some local elections).
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dard for implementing the Bandemer plurality's consistent degradation
test. Although no test as simple as the one person, one vote standard has
been developed, one possible test is the bipartisan compromise test. Under
this test, a redistricting plan should be upheld if it is the result of a bipartisan compromise or yields results similar to those of bipartisan redistricting plans in a state with a similar legislative delegation size and partisan
balance. Unlike some tests, the bipartisan compromise test does not require enormous mathematical expertise. Also, unlike other possible standards, the bipartisan compromise test is directly tied to the key evil arising
from gerrymandering-the imbalance between the parties' vote shares and
their share of legislative seats. As a result, the bipartisan compromise test
will rarely require courts to strike down innocuous districting plans or
uphold the most extreme gerrymanders. Thus, the bipartisan compromise
test is more practical than other possible standards.
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